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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions concerning preclusion doctrine stress the 
“deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.”1  
Nonetheless, “properly conducted class actions”2 are a recognized exception to this 
general rule because such actions ensure that nonparties are “adequately represented 
by someone with the same interests who was a party to the suit.”3  Mass torts, 
however, frequently involve numerous plaintiffs with diverse legal and factual issues 
that are not “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”4  Thus, 
it may be reasonably feared that the Court’s firm insistence on preserving individual 
                                                 
 1 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 
40 (1940)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (vacating 
certification of a Title VII gender discrimination class action for lack of “the existence of any 
common question” across the class); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) 
(certification of a limited fund asbestos class action inappropriate given the numerous 
individual issues and intra-class conflicts); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 
(1997) (rejecting certification of asbestos class action). 
 2 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894 (recognizing six exceptions to the day in court ideal). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 623. 
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autonomy will deny plaintiffs the economies of scale and other benefits of class 
actions that make it economically viable to advance their claims.5   
Although repeat players6 have largely abandoned the mass tort class action, they 
have effectively modified other aggregative devices to operate in largely the same 
manner as class actions—so much so that some have characterized them as “quasi-
class actions.”7  Asbestos bankruptcies, for example, are often controlled by one or 
more of the lawyers who advanced the Amchem and Ortiz settlement class actions, 
follow the same basic settlement design, and are otherwise functionally equivalent to 
the settlements rejected by the Court in those cases.8  And plaintiffs’ lawyers in these 
quasi-class actions tend to enjoy substantially all of the leverage and economies of 
scale as they should expect to find in a class action. 
This trend toward converting other forms of aggregation into quasi-class actions 
is perhaps most evident in federal multidistrict consolidation under 28 U.S.C. § 
1407, which has become the most common mechanism for the collective 
management and settlement of mass tort matters in the last decade.9  Unlike a class 
                                                 
 5 See, e.g., Sergio Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059 (2012) 
(criticizing the Court’s focus on individual autonomy and advancing a deterrence-centered 
model for evaluating due process in the mass tort setting). 
 6 As used herein, the term “repeat players” refers to plaintiffs’ lawyers and other 
professionals who specialize in aggregate litigation. 
 7 Judges and commentators have used the term “quasi-class actions” to liken non-class 
aggregation to class actions.  See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 
271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature of a private 
agreement between individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has many of the characteristics 
of a class action; it may be characterized properly as a quasi-class action subject to the general 
equitable power of the court."); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611-12 
(E.D.L.A. 2008) ("[T]he Vioxx global settlement may properly be analyzed as occurring in a 
quasi-class action, giving the Court equitable authority . . . ."); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 95, n.22 
(2011); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 
480-81 (1994) ("What is clear from the huge consolidations required in mass torts is that they 
have many of the characteristics of class actions. . . .  It is my conclusion . . . that mass 
consolidations are in effect quasi-class actions.  Obligations to claimants, defendants, and the 
public remain much the same whether the cases are gathered together by bankruptcy 
proceedings, class actions, or national or local consolidations."). 
 8 Accord Samuel Isacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 
210 (“To the untutored eye, the 524(g) workout looks strikingly similar to the efforts to obtain 
a judicial imprimatur for work-outs of present and future claims, as were struck down in 
Amchem and Ortiz.  For good reason, as it appears that way to the tutored eye as well.  The 
practical effect is that an agreement broadly supported by present claimants can be used to 
cram down the claims not only of dissenting plaintiffs, but of future claimants as well.  The 
bankruptcy work-out includes a Future Claimants Representative who assumes a fiduciary 
responsibility.  But the major difference is that the statutory scheme substitutes an Article I 
judge for an Article III judge, hardly a stirring form of enhanced protection for the due process 
interests that are at stake.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex 
Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2057 (2011) 
(“[M]ass tort actions that cannot be litigated as class actions because individual issues of 
causation and injury predominate over common issues are often aggregated using the MDL 
device.”); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing 
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action, where the wide range of individual issues among prospective class members 
will often preclude certification,10 even substantial legal and factual differences 
among plaintiffs’ claims do not preclude consolidation in multidistrict litigation.11  
Rather, the focus is whether transferring and consolidating the cases will serve “the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct 
of such actions.”12 The great weakness of section 1407, however, is that it lacks any 
direct structural mechanism for compelling plaintiffs to act in their collective—as 
opposed to individual—self-interest, which may either allow defendants to “divide 
and conquer”13 the claim pool or preclude favorable settlements from obtaining 
sufficient support to become final.14  That said, the absence of such a structural 
mechanism is more an inconvenience than an insurmountable barrier; repeat players 
exercise—and continue to build upon—the tools available to them to maintain 
cohesion and obtain sufficient consent to settle even the most diverse and complex 
mass tort cases today.  
Yet in capturing much of what makes the class action viable, the quasi-class 
multidistrict tort model also strips plaintiffs of the means of protecting their own 
interests from overreaching repeat players.  Viewed from the perspective of relative 
power relations, the Court’s class action cases that have emphasized the value of 
preserving the “day in court” involved matters in which repeat players—class 
counsel, for example—so fully dominated the process that disempowered plaintiffs’ 
interests could not be adequately represented.  In the asbestos class actions of the late 
1990s, for example, the intrinsic conflicts among current and future class members 
                                                 
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 108 (2010) 
(marking the growth of the quasi-class action); John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: 
Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2232 (2008) (Chair of the Judicial Panel of 
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) noting transition of some litigants to the MDL process given 
the limitations on class actions and the growth of open Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) dockets 
from 161 in 1997 to 297 in 2007). 
 10 See, e.g., Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not be Televised, 
12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665 (2011); Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of 
Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 794 (2010) (“[I]t has 
become exceedingly difficult to certify a class in the context of a mass tort.”); Myriam Gilles, 
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005). 
 11 See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Defective Spark Plug & 3-Valve Engine Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (“Section 1407 does not require a complete 
identity or even a majority of common factual issues as a prerequisite to centralization.”) 
(citing In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2009)); In re 
Wright Med. Tech., Inc., Conserve Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1371 
(J.P.M.L. 2012) (noting that “almost all injury litigation involve questions of causation that 
are case- and plaintiff-specific” and concluding “[s]uch differences have not been an 
impediment to centralization in the past”); In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., 
717 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (noting that product liability cases usually 
involve “multiple individualized fact issues,” but that does not preclude consolidation). 
 12 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006). 
 13 See, e.g., Sergio Campos, The Future of Mass Torts . . . and How to Stop it, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. PENNumbra 231, 233 (2011). 
 14 See infra Part III.B. 
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raised serious doubts that all of the various subclasses’ interests would be 
protected.15  The quasi-class Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) may ostensibly preserve 
plaintiffs’ rights to exclude themselves from any settlement, but the private 
mechanisms employed by repeat players to compel consent do no less violence to 
disempowered plaintiffs’ rights than the structural mechanisms found in mandatory 
class actions. 
My objective in this Article is to examine the manner in which repeat player 
domination is achieved in non-binding global mass tort settlements in multidistrict 
litigation.  Thus, Part II begins with an overview of the rise of the modern mass tort, 
how these matters are swept into and progress in federal multidistrict litigation, and 
the structural limits of section 1407 once settlement is reached.  Part III addresses the 
role of repeat players and the tools that lead counsel can employ to effectively 
foreclose plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain resolutions on the merits when they are 
dissatisfied with the global settlement.  Part IV examines the combined effect of the 
structure of section 1407 and these tools on plaintiffs’ rights and the perceived 
legitimacy of the process.  Finally, Part V proposes a distinct model for aggregate 
governance in multidistrict mass tort litigation that balances the need for cohesion 
and finality against the need to preserve and enhance plaintiffs’ voice and exit 
options.   
II.  MULTIDISTRICT CONSOLIDATION AND THE MODERN MASS TORT 
A.  Pretrial Consolidation Under Section 1407 
A popular account of the life cycle of a mass tort breaks it into an immature 
stage, where uncertainty about how courts and juries are likely to resolve the basic 
legal or medical issues common to all claims remains, and the mature stage, at which 
a consensus concerning these issues is more or less established.  It is fair to 
characterize a mass tort as mature when “there has been full and complete discovery, 
multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs’ contentions.”16  At 
this point, “little or no new evidence will be developed, significant appellate review 
of any novel legal issues has been concluded, and at least one full cycle of trial 
strategies has been exhausted.”17  After a tort matures, parties tend to focus on 
settlement according to established precedent and practice rather than continued 
litigation. 
At the immature stage, firms will have little guidance for evaluating the risk of 
success or failure, making the risk of developing a large number of claims 
substantial.18  Accordingly, we should expect to see relatively limited investment in 
client recruiting efforts prior to maturity.  Conversely, investment in a given mass 
tort will accelerate as it approaches and enters into the mature stage because the 
prospects for success concerning these core items will become less uncertain. The 
                                                 
 15 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856-58 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624-27 (1997). 
 16 Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 
(1989). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
525, 528, n.12 (2007). 
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demand for streamlined settlement increases as the volume of claims increases.  
This, in turn, may lead to an influx of dubious claims.19 
Although caution may have been the mantra in the 1970s and 1980s, the large-
scale client solicitation efforts that once began in earnest only after signs of litigation 
success begin today within hours of a catastrophic event, announcement of a 
potential product defect, or other sign that a new mass tort will emerge in the near 
future.20  Depending on the specific circumstances of the emerging mass tort, the 
defendant may first experience anywhere from a few individual lawsuits to a sudden 
deluge of individual and class actions across the country in the months that follow.  
Increasingly, however, attorney efforts to build sizeable claim portfolios21 precede 
any significant litigation activity once one of these catalysts occurs.22   
The trend in recent years has been for one or more parties to petition the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to consolidate facially distinct and 
geographically diverse cases within a centralized court very early in the tort’s life 
cycle.23  Absent the constraints of Rule 23,24 repeat players in the plaintiffs’ bar 
increasingly move for multidistrict consolidation early in the belief that they can 
obtain consolidation in a friendly transferee court,25 where they may stand a better 
                                                 
 19 See, e.g., S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlements, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 
559 (2012) (outlining the manner in which predictability encourages practices that generate 
specious claims); Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of 
Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 188 (2001) 
(“In mature mass torts, where there may be a widely-shared understanding of the value of 
certain types of claims, thousands of lesser-value claims may be resolved en masse according 
to negotiated schedules of damages that pay little attention to individual claim differences and 
involve little adversarial litigation.”); McGovern, supra note 16, at 688. 
 20 See LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY 
COST AMERICA 253-54 (2011). 
 21 The term “claim portfolio” refers to the collective pool of claims controlled by the 
lawyer.  See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client 
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 533 (2003) 
(“Regardless of whether plaintiffs’ claims are formally aggregated, the lawyer representing 
many similarly situated clients necessarily handles the litigation on a group basis.  In 
preparing pleadings, conducting discovery, retaining experts, preparing for trial, and 
negotiating settlement, the lawyer addresses the plaintiffs’ claims primarily as a group.”). 
 22 See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts in the Real World: 
A Rebuttal to the Mandatory Class Actions Idea, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNumbra 237, 237-38 
(2011). 
 23 See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“As 
use of the class action device to aggregate claims has become more difficult, MDL 
consolidation has increased in importance as a means of achieving final, global resolution of 
mass national disputes.”); see also Interview with Hon. John G. Heyburn, Panel Promotes Just 
and Efficient Conduct of Litigation (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/ 
General_Info/Third_Branch_Interviews/The_Third_Branch_-_February-2010-Heyburn_Inter 
view.pdf (noting the trend toward centralization under section 1407 and the panel’s efforts to 
shorten the time between the filing of a motion for consolidation and a decision). 
 24 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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chance of obtaining leadership appointments and avoiding unfavorable rulings.26  
Defendants may also favor early consolidation instead of suffering the business 
disruption and expense of coordinating the defense of multiple cases spread across 
potentially dozens of jurisdictions.27   
B.  Selecting Lead Counsel and Managing Dissent 
Once the underlying cases are consolidated within a federal MDL, the transferee 
court will typically focus first on the selection of lead counsel.  As the JPML guide 
for MDL judges notes, “Early organization of the counsel who have filed the various 
cases is a critical case-management task.”28  The transferee courts tend to issue 
pretrial case management orders early in the case and, once appointed, press lead 
counsel to advance discovery plans promptly.  At this point, the court may rule on a 
broad range of pretrial matters, including discovery disputes, early dispositive 
motions, and Daubert29 and other evidentiary issues.   
The competition for leadership roles in the MDL usually begins before the JPML 
authorizes consolidation.30  Repeat players must recruit aggressively31 and “can 
spend as much time jockeying for position among their rivals as they do attacking 
corporate wrongdoers.”32 Within the relatively small community of repeat players 
who dominate multidistrict mass tort cases,33 relationships and understandings are 
                                                 
 25 The court that is selected to oversee the MDL proceedings is referred to as the 
“transferee court” to reflect the fact that the cases are transferred to the court for pretrial 
proceedings consistent with section 1407.  Conversely, the courts in which the cases were 
filed and may be returned upon the conclusion of the MDL proceedings are referred to as the 
“transferor courts.” 
 26 See generally Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL: A Defense Perspective, 24 
LITIG. 43 (1998). 
 27 See generally id. 
 28 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
CASES: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 10 (2011); see also JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIG. & FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFEREE JUDGES 2 (2009), [hereinafter MDL GUIDE], 
available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/TenSteps-MDLGuide-2009-Transferee_Judges.pdf 
(noting that appointment of lead counsel is one of the first and “most important decisions” the 
MDL judge must make).  
 29 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 30 Gary Wilson et al., The Future of Products Liability in America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 85, 108 (2000) (describing contests for steering committee roles as “Washington-styled 
lobbying”).   
 31 See Erichson, supra note 22, at 238; Douglas McCollam, Slick on Slick, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2010, at 44 (“As the term implies, a key to influence in a mass tort is achieving mass. 
From the moment a cataclysm like BP's Deepwater Horizon blowout occurs, a trial lawyer is 
on the clock. How much power he can wield in the expanding litigation is often determined, 
or at least influenced, by how many clients he has and how quickly he gets to court.”). 
 32 McCollam, supra note 31, at 44. 
 33 See, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation 
of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 172 (2004) (discussing 
concentration of control by lead firms across different mass torts); Samuel Issacharoff, 
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formed across cases, altering the manner in which these repeat players manage the 
case, assign potentially lucrative common benefit work and negotiate settlement 
terms. Although these appointments are technically within the discretion of the judge 
overseeing the MDL,34 the participating firms and lawyers frequently enjoy 
considerable influence in the selection.35  In some cases, participants will agree to the 
entire composition of the steering committee and iron out any objections before 
presenting a list to the judge.36  Alternatively, the judge may make the initial steering 
committee and other leadership appointments without deferring to the lawyers 
involved but leave the final decisions concerning specific work assignments in the 
MDL to be worked out among counsel.37   
                                                 
“Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2002) (“The plaintiffs’ market operates through an elaborate referral 
system that concentrates cases in the hands of a small number of repeat-player firms.”); Steve 
Baughman Jensen, Like Lemonade, Ethics Comes Best When it’s Old-Fashioned: A Response 
to Professor Moore, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 216-17 (1999) (“Finally, mass tort victims benefit 
from joint representation because, through the referral process, their claims tend eventually to 
be handled by the most-qualified lawyers, those who have specialized in their specific type of 
litigation.  As an illustration, we need look only to the familiar example of the asbestos cases, 
which have now been consolidated in the hands of no more than approximately twenty law 
firms around the country that devote most of their resources to asbestos litigation and are 
highly proficient at handling asbestos-related injury claims.”); Herrman, supra note 26, at 47 
(“Particularly in mass tort MDLs, there are certain prominent lawyers who are named 
repeatedly to the plaintiffs' steering committees.”). 
 34 Over time, the Manual For Complex Litigation has shifted from suggesting control over 
selection for lead counsel by “parties having a common interest” to encouraging judges to take 
“an active part in making decisions on the appointment of counsel.”  See MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FIRST) §§ 1.92, 4.53 (1982) (stating that "Lead counsel are chosen by 
the groups of parties having a common interest"; in "exceptional circumstances" or when the 
parties fail to choose, courts may do so); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 
20.224 (1985) (advising judges to oversee appointment of steering committees); MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) §§ 20.222, 20.224 (1995) (recommending that judges take "an 
active part in making the decisions on the appointment of counsel"); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.244 (2004) (same). 
 35 For example, as the Wall Street Journal explained in the Toyota MDL: 
Judge Selna will have the final say on which lawyers will take the lead in the case. 
Judges usually allow lawyers to first duke it out among themselves, then rely on a 
slate presented to them.  Judge Selna has appointed three interim lead attorneys who 
have put together a slate of lawyers to take the lead after a series of attorney meetings 
in a Newport Beach, Calif., restaurant, a Chicago hotel and a Las Vegas casino to 
fight for positions. 
Dionne Searcey, Lawyers Wrestle Over Driver's Seat in Litigation Against Toyota, WALL ST. 
J., May 5, 2010, at A1. 
 36 In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp. 
2d 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2011). 
 37 See Order No. 5, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales 
Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
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A critical objective at this stage is to ensure that the lawyers work together and 
advance the collective interests of the claim pool in a cohesive fashion.38  This goal 
is advanced, in part, by assigning key leadership roles to influential repeat players 
and providing them with largely unfettered control over the proceedings.39  It is 
reinforced by judicial control over the purse strings—judges overseeing multidistrict 
litigation routinely order a percentage of the fees lawyers earn from the case set 
aside to pay for the costs incurred by lead and other counsel in connection with the 
MDL.40  After the fund is established, the court typically asks lead counsel (or a 
special committee comprised of attorneys who have served in the MDL) to 
recommend allocations to the lawyers who have worked on the case.  The transferee 
court, of course, has final say over any allocations from the fund.  Thus, as others 
have noted previously, the lawyers and firms involved have strong incentives to 
avoid appearing disruptive or uncooperative.41 
C.  Discovery, Bellwether Trials, and Settlement Framing 
Efficient discovery and consistency of pretrial rulings are central to purpose of 
section 1407, and the transferee judge has broad discretion in designing the 
discovery plan.42  In complex matters involving both common and distinct issues, 
transferee judges frequently adopt staggered discovery plans that appear to both 
prioritize discovery into core matters first and allow for adaptation in future stages to 
account for discoveries in earlier stages.43  Pursuing multiple lines of discovery at 
once is, of course, permissible, but doing so may not be viewed as efficient at the 
outset, particularly in cases that are consolidated shortly after the triggering event 
gave rise to the action.  
                                                 
 38 Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict 
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2000 (2011) (discussing this focus is geared toward 
advancing global settlement and works against advancing cases for actual trial). 
 39 See, e.g., id. at 1986. 
 40  Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing 
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010). 
 41 See, e.g., id. at 109-10 (“In practical effect, MDL judges are lead lawyers' clients. Fee-
related concerns also cause non-lead lawyers to fear MDL judges, who take from them the 
money lead lawyers receive.  By challenging an MDL judge, a non-lead lawyer must be 
willing to risk retribution in the form of a heavy fee tax.  Because judges leave the size of 
forced fee transfers open until litigation ends, obedience is the prudent course for non-lead 
lawyers until an MDL formally concludes—or even longer when non-lead lawyers have cases 
in other MDLs being handled by the same judge.”).  Likewise, those who attempt to 
undermine lead counsel outside of court may suffer because judges increasingly request input 
on fee allocation decisions from the lead lawyers in the case.  See In re Diet Drugs Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2002 WL 32154197, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2002) (MDL 1203) 
(collecting cases). 
 42 See, e.g., In re Celotex Corp. "Technifoam" Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 1077 
(J.P.M.L. 1977). 
 43 See, e.g., Order No. 5, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, 
Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (MDL 2151) (“It 
is expected that discovery on foundational issues during Phase I will enable the parties to 
develop a more narrowly tailored discovery plan for subsequent phases of this litigation and to 
be more focused, economical and efficient in subsequent phases of discovery.”). 
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Following discovery, MDL courts frequently schedule a series of bellwether 
trials rather than remand the cases to the forums from whence they came.44  The 
purpose is not to achieve global finality through trial; indeed, such an approach 
exceeds the limits of the ostensibly pretrial work of the MDL court.45  Rather, these 
trials are intended “to provide meaningful information and experience to everyone 
involved in the litigations.”46  And Judges Fallon, Grabill and Wynne recently 
explained: 
Bellwether trials thus assist in the maturation of any given dispute by 
providing an opportunity for coordinating counsel to organize the 
products of pretrial common discovery, evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of their arguments and evidence, and understand the risks and 
costs associated with the litigation.  Indeed, the utilization of bellwether 
jury trials can enhance and accelerate the MDL process in two key 
respects.  First, bellwether trials allow coordinating counsel to hone their 
presentation for subsequent trials and can lead to the development of “trial 
packages” for use by local counsel upon the dissolution of MDLs. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, bellwether trials can precipitate 
and inform settlement negotiations by indicating future trends, that is, by 
providing guidance on how similar claims may fare before subsequent 
juries.47 
Ideally, then, bellwether trials will not merely accelerate global resolution; rather, 
global settlement will occur because they effectively accelerate the perceived 
maturity of the litigation.48   
                                                 
 44 Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 609 
(2012). 
 45 See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 497 F.3d 1005, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007) 
("We recognize that the results of the Hanford bellwether trial are not binding on the 
remaining plaintiffs."); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000) ("There 
is no indication in the record before us that the parties understood the first trial would decide 
specific issues to bind subsequent trials."); In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 725 (3d Cir. 1999) 
("Absent a positive manifestation of agreement by Non-Trial Plaintiffs, we cannot conclude 
that their Seventh Amendment right is not compromised by extending a summary judgment 
against the Trial Plaintiffs to the non-participating, non-trial plaintiff."); Cimino v. Raymark 
Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 318 (5th Cir. 1998); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(FOURTH) § 20.132 (2004) ("The transferee court could conduct a bellwether trial of a 
centralized action or actions originally filed in the transferee district, the results of which (1) 
may, upon the consent of parties to constituent actions not filed in the transferee district, be 
binding on those parties and actions, or (2) may otherwise promote settlement in the 
remaining actions." (footnote omitted)). 
 46 Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2323, 2332 (2008); see also Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives 
and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 697 (2006). 
 47 Fallon et al., supra note 46, at 2338. 
 48 See Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 123, 124 (2012) (“A private mass tort settlement begins as a contractual agreement 
between plaintiffs' liaison counsel and the defendant(s) involved in a particular mass tort 
litigation that sets forth a negotiated settlement offer for each individual plaintiff to consider. 
The substance of the settlement offer consists of a commitment by the defendant(s) to pay a 
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Regardless of whether this idealized vision of the process reflects settlement 
premised upon the true maturation of the tort or merely provides a baseline for 
structuring a global settlement in lieu of true maturation, the result is frequently the 
same: bellwether trials are highly effective at promoting global settlement.49  Indeed, 
the very threat of bellwether trials appears to have a comparable effect on promoting 
settlement even where the process has not yielded anything that could be reasonably 
characterized as transforming the tort into “mature” status.50 
D.  Global Settlement in Multidistrict Litigation 
At settlement, the intrinsic systemic limitations of section 1407 are perhaps most 
problematic for defendants and lead plaintiffs’ counsel.  Although section 1407 
contemplates that settlement may occur before remand to transferor courts,51 it does 
not provide a mechanism for binding non-consenting plaintiffs to the settlement’s 
terms. If the facts of the case permit, the MDL judge may oversee one or more 
limited settlement class actions filed in the transferee court, but the judge cannot 
self-assign cases for trial.52 In short, section 1407 lacks any direct structural 
framework for ensuring that the matter can be resolved once and for all through 
litigation or global settlement in the transferee court. 
The absence of a clear procedural framework for settlement is not surprising 
given the stated purpose of section 1407: pretrial consolidation.  Although such 
sweeping consolidations may provide a forum that encourages private resolution as a 
practical matter, any resolution on the substantive merits remains the function of 
individual or properly certified class action trials.  As noted previously, it is this 
potential—the plaintiffs’ power to control the ultimate decision to proceed to trial or 
                                                 
fixed amount to the current aggregate plaintiff population, with individual awards varying 
based on the strength of each plaintiff's claim as determined by the allocation of "points" 
among the plaintiffs by a neutral administrator pursuant to negotiated—and often very 
complex—formulas and grids.  Those settlement formulas and grids tend to be based on real-
world information and experience gained through discovery, pretrial rulings, and bellwether 
jury trials, all of which increasingly occur in the context of a multidistrict litigation proceeding 
created pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.  In other words, private mass tort settlements often 
await and account for the maturation of the litigation.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Effron, supra note 9, at 2057 (“Although the transferee judge must send cases 
back to the original district for trial, the MDL is a powerful aggregation device because most 
cases settle before trial.”); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex 
Litigation if a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2206 n.4 (2008) ("Few 
cases are remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the transferee court."). 
 50 Two recent cases, the World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation and the Deepwater 
Horizon litigation, were settled shortly before the first bellwether trials in those cases were 
scheduled to begin.  John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling Lawsuit Over BP Oil Spill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2012, at A1 (settlement announced three days before the first phase of the 
Deepwater Horizon bellwether trials were scheduled to begin); Mireya Navarro, Deal is 
Reached on Health Costs of 9/11 Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A1 (WTC 
settlement reached roughly two months before bellwether trials were scheduled to begin). 
 51 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West 2012) (requiring remand of a transferred case once pretrial 
work is completed “unless it shall have been previously terminated”). 
 52 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) 
(noting that MDL judge may not self-assign a case for trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). 
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settle once pretrial work is done—that allows section 1407 consolidations to avoid 
the restraints that preclude similarly sweeping mass tort class actions.  Although this 
potential recommends multidistrict consolidation early in the proceedings, it 
suggests that the post-consolidation stage will break down into dozens, hundreds or 
thousands of individual actions and settlements that may involve additional 
discovery, repetitive litigation concerning similar issues across forums, and 
inconsistent rulings concerning these issues.  In sum, section 1407 can bring the 
claim pool to the settlement finish line, but it does not provide the court with the 
power to make the plaintiffs cross it. 
III.  PRIVATE POWER RELATIONS IN THE MASS TORT MDL 
No discussion of aggregative procedures is complete without a practical 
assessment of the manner in which these procedures alter power relations among the 
parties.  Yet the literature concerning the shifting power relations in aggregate 
litigation is incomplete.  The focus is most often on the relative economies of scale 
and power imbalance between defendants and plaintiffs in the absence of 
aggregation. But another important shift in power relations—among plaintiffs, their 
personal counsel and the lawyers who control the MDL proceedings—is an essential 
element in the transformation of these pretrial proceedings into a mechanism for 
achieving global private settlements.53    
The focus here is not to revisit lead lawyers’ unfettered control over the 
plaintiffs’ side of the litigation within the MDL.  Rather, it is how this control, 
combined with the dynamics of mass tort litigation recruiting and networks 
generally, allows lead counsel to bridge the gap between the structural limits of 
section 1407 and the need for finality in structuring any global settlement. 
A.  Plaintiffs, Counsel, and Lead Counsel 
The quasi-class MDL may bear several similarities to the class action, but its 
very existence is the product of the limits of traditional class actions.  In a properly 
certified class action, the representative plaintiffs’ interests are largely the same as—
or at least not in conflict with—the other members of the class.54  As recognized in 
Amchem and Ortiz, however, mass torts frequently involve numerous plaintiffs with 
diverse legal and factual issues that are not “sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.”55  Thus, the quasi-class MDL begins not only with 
the recognition that individual plaintiffs may have different interests in the 
                                                 
 53 RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT ix (2007) (“One 
significant facet of the mass tort phenomenon consists of the emergence and operation of an 
elite segment of the personal injury plaintiffs’ bar.  These lawyers specialize in the 
identification, development, and comprehensive resolution of whole categories of mass tort 
disputes.  The story of this mass tort plaintiffs’ bar—indeed, the intense, competitive 
relationship among such law firms—is as much a part of the mass tort world as legal 
doctrine.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry 
into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 588-89 (discussing certification 
standards as a means of avoiding conflicts between the representative plaintiff or class counsel 
and the interests of other class members). 
 55 Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 
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proceedings56 but also that these diverse interests are entitled to independent 
representation. 
Consolidations under section 1407 do not strip individual plaintiffs of their 
chosen counsel with respect to their individual claims, but such consolidations alter 
plaintiffs’ potential to monitor developments that affect their interests.  The client 
solicitation and referral practices57 that are common in mass tort litigation frequently 
place one attorney in control of multiple claims against the same defendants even 
without formal consolidation. Some of these lawyers, in turn, assume leadership 
positions on the steering committees established to represent the claim pool 
collectively.  Thus, lawyers with whom an individual plaintiff does not have a 
relationship may make many of the most significant decisions concerning her case.   
The net result is that MDLs involve lawyers who enjoy influence over the 
direction of the case and the terms of the settlement, on the one hand, and 
disempowered lawyers who lack such influence on the other.  Some disempowered 
lawyers may be conciliatory—hoping to leverage their compliance with the dictates 
of lead counsel into common benefit work assignments in the instant case or future 
cases.  Others, however, may assume a more aggressive posture—using the claims 
they control to undermine any settlement or, at least, exact preferential treatment—in 
order to discourage other repeat players from excluding them from the negotiating 
table.  Effective MDL management on the plaintiffs’ side demands not only 
cooperation among lead counsel but also careful attention to the demands of 
disempowered lawyers who may control sufficient claim volumes to undermine any 
proposed settlement. 
B.  The Autonomy Problem in Multidistrict Settlement 
The inability to bind all plaintiffs to a global settlement under section 1407 
presents an obvious problem: defendants will not enter into a global settlement if 
they cannot be reasonably certain that it will bring peace.58  Plaintiffs with the 
strongest claims will simply allow their claims to return to the transferor court and 
proceed with litigation, while those with weaker claims accept the settlement’s 
terms.59  This tendency toward adverse selection in a non-binding global settlement 
is compounded where the very fact of settlement generates more claims, leading to 
rampant oversubscription against the settlement without making a significant dent in 
the defendant’s potential liability to those advancing strong claims.60  In sum, no 
matter how bad reverting to scattered litigation across multiple jurisdictions may be 
for the defendant, a wide-open global settlement that preserves opt-out rights is 
likely to be worse. 
Another problem is the risk that “holdout plaintiffs” will threaten to reject the 
settlement unless they receive preferential treatment.  This threat only has force to 
the extent that the plaintiffs exercising it have the power to undermine the 
                                                 
 56 See supra note 11. 
 57 Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 
2005 UTAH L. REV. 863 (2005). 
 58 See NAGAREDA, supra note 53, at 12. 
 59 Brown, supra note 19, at 587-91. 
 60 Id. at 602-05. 
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settlement, and few global settlements demand 100% acceptance.61  The real threat is 
that one or more disempowered attorneys representing several plaintiffs will, 
individually or collectively, reject the settlement in their clients’ names or persuade 
their clients to reject the settlement due to misinformation or promises of greater 
potential recoveries down the road. 
The fen-phen national settlement is a stark example of these problems in action.62  
Although plaintiffs had the ability to opt out of the settlement, it was well funded 
(initially, at $3.75 billion) and included multiple provisions designed to preclude 
oversubscription.63  Nonetheless, the settlement received more qualifying claims than 
was statistically believed to be possible,64 and several plaintiffs opted out.  In short, it 
was a disastrous settlement for the defendant, who, to date, has incurred litigation 
and settlement costs well in excess of $20 billion.65 
Merck’s initial strategy with respect to the Vioxx personal injury mass tort—
litigate every case,66 may thus be seen as a rational response to the fen-phen 
settlement debacle, even if some observers were appalled by the approach.67  The 
Vioxx case bore substantial similarities to the fen-phen case—millions of regular 
users of the drugs, statistically higher rates of certain conditions associated with use 
of the drugs, the difficulty in establishing that exposure to the drugs (as opposed to 
other causal factors) was or was not a substantial factor in any individual patient’s 
injury, and the difficulties in screening out specious claims in any global settlement 
–and suggested that even a well-structured global settlement might likewise be 
overrun.  Instead of pursuing early settlement, Merck litigated eighteen cases to 
judgment, winning eleven at trial and enjoying additional success on appeal.68  In the 
process, Merck effectively signaled that it would rather pay its lawyers than settle 
weak cases; if a global settlement could not be structured to avoid the defendant’s 
fate in the fen-phen matter, there would be no settlement at all. 
After Merck’s initial success, albeit at great cost to the company,69 the plaintiffs’ 
steering committee and Merck structured a global settlement that facially preserved 
the right to pursue individual litigation but included terms that made it “practically 
                                                 
 61 Erichson, supra note 21, at 574. 
 62 Although fen-phen was technically a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class action, its example 
is relevant to modern multidistrict litigation given that both afford plaintiffs with the option to 
reject global settlement.  Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus 
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 274-75 (2011) (contrasting the Rule 23(b)(3) settlement in 
fen-phen against the private settlement in Vioxx). 
 63 See Brown, supra note 19, at 583-86. 
 64 See NAGAREDA, supra note 53, at 145-46. 
 65 See Brown, supra note 19, at 586. 
 66 See Frank M. McClellan, The Vioxx Litigation: A Critical Look at Trial Tactics, the 
Tort System, and the Roles of Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 509, 514-
17 (2008) (discussing Merck’s initial strategy in the Vioxx litigation). 
 67 See id. at 522-534 (discussing the ethical and moral dimensions of the Merck strategy). 
 68 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 62, at 278-79. 
 69 McClellan, supra note 66, at 510 (discussing the “millions of dollars in legal fees and 
other trial expenses” spent by Merck in litigating Vioxx cases). 
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impossible for a claimant to decline the offer.”70  The settlement included a clause 
that allowed the defendant to walk away if less that 85% of eligible claimants in 
multiple categories did not participate.71  Lawyers who signed the agreement or 
enrolled a client in the program were required to recommend the deal to every 
client72 and refuse to represent those who rejected the deal going forward.73  In short, 
plaintiffs could choose to walk away, but doing so meant starting over from scratch 
without the benefit of their existing counsel or any other attorney with significant 
experience in the litigation. 
Whatever one thinks of the fen-phen and Vioxx settlements, it is sufficient at this 
point to note that they reveal a clear tension between the systemic preference for 
global settlement and the private self-interests that, left unchecked, work against it.  
If a global settlement is to occur, the defendant must have some assurance of peace.  
But peace is one thing that multidistrict litigation is ill equipped to ensure; it lacks 
the binding force of bankruptcy or mandatory class actions, and even the best laid 
private settlement plans that freely preserve individual autonomy can go horribly 
awry.   
The Vioxx settlement also provides a stark and frequently criticized example of 
how private power relations between plaintiffs and their attorneys can be employed 
to bridge the gap between pretrial consolidation and global settlement.  Given 
Merck’s relative success at trial, however, its “litigate every case” strategy and 
apparent commitment to continue along this course in the absence of sufficient 
assurances of peace generated considerable uncertainty for plaintiffs’ lawyers and 
demanded the use of aggressive private restraints on individual litigants.  And 
though it is easy to take issue with the overtly coercive terms of the settlement, it is 
also easy to see why settling counsel and defendants felt resort to such terms was 
necessary under the circumstances. 
C.  The Structural and Systemic Dominance of Repeat Players 
Although section 1407 does not provide any direct structural power to force 
plaintiffs to abide by the terms of any global settlement, repeat players enjoy 
considerable power to dominate settlement decisions with or without the coercive 
terms found in the Vioxx settlement.  As Ian Shapiro observed in the political 
context: 
[D]omination can result from a person’s, or a group’s, shaping agendas, 
constraining options, and, in the limiting case, influencing people’s 
preferences and desires.  Domination can also occur without the need for 
explicit commands when one person or group secures the compliance of 
another as a by-product of their control of resources that are essential for 
                                                 
 70 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 62 (discussing the Vioxx global settlement). 
 71 See id. 
 72 See Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the 
Signature Pages Hereto, No. 2:0MD01657, 2008 WL 7084949, at § 1.2.8.1. (E.D. La. July 9, 
2008) (MD 1657). 
 73 Id. § 1.2.8.2. 
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the second person or group, or, in the terminology I will deploy, is in a 
position to threaten their basic interests.74 
Although multidistrict consolidation governance is obviously distinct from 
political governance in many respects, repeat players enjoy comparable avenues for 
domination over plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation.  They shape agendas for the 
litigation, can manipulate the claim pool’s preferences through information control 
and modifying the composition of the pool, have the power to constrain litigation 
options during the proceedings, control the options available under any settlement, 
and may directly or indirectly limit the resources available for plaintiffs to advance 
their interests outside of any settlement. 
1.  Shaping the Agenda 
As noted previously, lead counsel enjoy largely unfettered control over the 
plaintiffs’ agenda during multidistrict proceedings.  This control is reinforced by 
judicial reluctance to interfere with their choices and limited options for 
disempowered lawyers and plaintiffs to challenge them.75  Given the extreme 
deference the JPML affords transferee courts to retain or return individual cases to 
transferor courts, these disempowered participants cannot express their 
dissatisfaction through exit as long as lead counsel and the transferee court believe 
restraining their exit options advances the claim pool’s objectives.  Disempowered 
plaintiffs are left with no practical voice and, at best, must wait for months or years 
before exit is possible. 76 
If we assume that the claim pool is comprised of claims that center on the same 
basic legal and factual issues, the fact that a small group of sophisticated counsel 
controls the pretrial agenda may not be problematic.  But this assumption does not 
reflect the reality across mass harm multidistrict proceedings.  Plaintiffs within a 
claim pool will have conflicting interests in valuing their respective injuries, defining 
the criteria for qualifying for settlement, and, ultimately, in choosing to accept or 
reject any settlement that is proposed.  An attorney may support settlement criteria 
that reduce compensation and exit options for some plaintiffs but has the collective 
impact of increasing the total returns of the claim portfolio.77   
                                                 
 74 IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4 (2003). 
 75 See, e.g., Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in 
Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011) (“Lead attorneys enjoy 
plenary and, in many respects, exclusive control of the litigation.  Although they report to and 
receive input from disabled attorneys, they are independent actors who operate subject to no 
one’s control.  Disabled lawyers cannot tell lead attorneys what to do; nor can they fire them 
for disobedience.  If disabled lawyers dislike the way lead lawyers are performing, their only 
recourse is to complain to the trial judge, who, for a variety of reasons, is unlikely to be 
sympathetic.”). 
 76 Accord Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation’s Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 311, 317 (2009) 
(discussing statistical improbability that cases will be remanded to transferor courts and 
concluding, “when the JPML selects a transferee district and judge for an MDL, there is an 
overwhelming chance that it is assigning the constituent actions to their final resting place”). 
 77 Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Ethics on the Lunar Landscape of Asbestos Litigation, 31 
PEPP. L. REV. 175, 192 (2003) (“The mass tort lawyer cannot deal with his or her clients on a 
one-to-one basis that permits full client participation in the litigation. This diffuse relationship 
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For example, in the World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, Judge 
Hellerstein noted severe conflicts of interests among plaintiffs who were collectively 
represented by one of the firms in that case: 
Approximately a third of the Plaintiffs had little or no objective injury 
traceable to their work at the WTC site, and were in the lowest settlement 
tiers. They may have had little or no option except to settle. Other 
Plaintiffs, despite contracting serious cancers, were facing the possibility 
of small settlement recoveries because of difficulties in proving causal 
relation with the toxins at the WTC site, and thus might nevertheless have 
wished to proceed to take their chances with Daubert motions and trial. 
The Tier IV Plaintiffs, those with serious and lasting ailments strongly 
related to their work at the WTC site, although well compensated under 
the SPA relative to others, also reasonably could have opted in favor of 
trial rather than settlement.78 
In light of these concerns, the court readily concluded that their lawyers were not 
in position to provide them with the independent advice and counsel they were 
entitled to receive.79  Although Judge Hellerstein concluded that these conflicts 
demanded judicial intervention in this case,80 courts rarely consider whether similar 
diverse interests within an attorney’s claim portfolio warrant comparable protections 
in other MDL cases.   
Similarly, in the Deepwater Horizon MDL, the claim pool included not only 
those advancing the economic and property damages claims that comprised the 
majority of the pool but also much smaller groups of plaintiffs whose interests in 
discovery and the litigation generally were only partially aligned with this majority.  
For example, the claims advanced on behalf of workers who were injured or killed in 
the initial explosion were swept into the MDL, delayed as lead counsel investigated 
numerous questions that were largely irrelevant to their cases, and further delayed 
pending the transferee court’s consideration of the settlement of the economic and 
property damage settlements.  Many of these victims were struggling financially as a 
result of the disaster and ultimately settled their cases individually—without the 
additional leverage afforded by trial or even a foreseeable trial date—in order to 
                                                 
inevitably will yield some level of client dissatisfaction and, because of compromises the 
attorney must make to formulate strategy for the group as a whole, may result in less-than-
zealous advocacy for positions of particular clients.”); Erichson, supra note 21, at 558-59 
(“Conflicts of interest in here in collective representation.  Unless the plaintiffs' interests are 
perfectly aligned, which is rare, a lawyer representing multiple plaintiffs with related claims 
inevitably faces decisions about whose interests to advance.  As Judge Jack Weinstein has 
explained with regard to mass tort litigation, ‘while the attorney representing a large number 
of clients might, in theory, be able to reach some approximation of the objectives of the group 
as a whole, that attorney cannot possibly account for the varying desires of individual 
members of the group.’  In mass litigation, any conflict between individual and group interests 
likely presents not only a concurrent client-client conflict, but also a concurrent client-lawyer 
conflict.  Plaintiffs' lawyers' fees, ordinarily tied to the size of the overall recovery for the 
group, give lawyers an economic stake in favoring group interests.”). 
 78 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id..  
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address their immediate financial concerns.  In these cases, it is easy to see how lead 
counsel’s ability to set the agenda and quash dissenting voices may have impacted 
the rights and recoveries of a small but severely injured minority. 
At this point, my focus is not whether the agenda shaping in the World Trade 
Center Disaster Site Litigation or the Deepwater Horizon MDL worked to the 
disadvantage of certain minority plaintiffs or whether this is, on balance, undesirable 
or illegitimate;81 it is to demonstrate that the power to shape agendas can be decisive 
in shaping litigants’ perceptions of their ability to advance their legitimate interests 
that are not part of that agenda.  Once that agenda is fixed, plaintiffs are most often 
powerless to voice their disapproval or exit.  Discovery costs and delays may mount 
while lead counsel advance issues that concern the majority but are irrelevant to 
disempowered plaintiffs, for whom the practical realities of their circumstances may 
not allow them to simply wait for a return to the transferor court.  And if these 
agendas lead to shaping settlements that simultaneously exclude and limit 
disempowered plaintiffs’ options to pursue their claims individually, the may not 
only lose the potential scale economies of aggregation but also find that proceeding 
individually is no longer economically viable.   
2.  Influencing Preferences Through Information Control 
Perhaps the greatest irony of mass tort multidistrict litigation is the degree to 
which plaintiffs lack ready access to the pretrial work performed for their benefit.  
Although global settlements do not generally contain the same sort of nondisclosure 
terms found in many individual settlements, few plaintiffs have both direct access to 
the discovery obtained and the time and resources to evaluate it before making the 
decision to settle or pursue tail litigation.  This information may be filtered through 
layers of lawyers, each with interests that may conflict with the plaintiff.  And in 
cases where global settlements occur before bellwether or other trials, plaintiffs may 
have little or no qualitative basis for assessing their prospects at trial. 
Qualitative information is, of course, a critical component of any settlement 
decision.  In traditional litigation, this decision is framed by an assessment of several 
factors; including the plaintiff’s objectives in the litigation, the amount she will 
receive to forego trial and the specific risks of losing at trial if she proceeds.  A 
plaintiff’s objectives and expectations are continually reshaped during the course of 
the litigation and associated settlement talks, with the plaintiff’s lawyer counseling 
the plaintiff concerning developments as they arise in the case and encouraging or 
discouraging settlement according to the ever-changing understanding of the case.  
The settlement offer tends to be a fixed dollar amount, and its fairness and adequacy 
can be assessed by the plaintiff and her counsel based on their respective 
understandings of the case when the offer is made. 
By contrast, an individual plaintiff’s decision to accept or reject a global 
settlement is often burdened by uncertainty about how the settlement will treat her 
claim.  At the time they must make this decision, plaintiffs usually do not know 
whether their respective claims will be approved and, if so, how their injuries will be 
classified.  Claim processors may interpret settlement language to exclude plaintiffs 
who may reasonably believe their claims will be accepted under the same terms.  
Moreover, even plaintiffs who are comfortable with their prospects for acceptance 
under the settlement’s terms and conditions may not be able to predict whether the 
                                                 
 81 See infra Part IV. 
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fund will be sufficient to pay all claims promptly or in full.  Claims that are selected 
for audit may be delayed, and settlements that are oversubscribed may have 
provisions allowing the administrator to reduce payments.  In short, plaintiffs must 
often make the settlement decision before they can know all of the information 
relevant to assessing the settlement’s treatment of their claims. 
Likewise, notwithstanding the extraordinary amount of resources devoted to 
advancing pre-trial matters in the MDL, the plaintiff’s settlement decision is further 
complicated by uncertainty about her prospects at trial.  Specific information about a 
defendant’s conduct and culpability will tend to promote litigation by those 
advancing the strongest claims.82  Individual plaintiffs, however, may have only 
limited knowledge of the information uncovered during discovery.  In settlements 
that occur prior to any trials, their ability to calculate the risks of trial in their own 
cases will be further limited.  The lawyers who are most familiar with all of this 
information—those in leadership and other roles in the MDL—may be unreliable 
sources of independent advice given their own interests in prompt settlement.  In 
sum, many plaintiffs must make the settlement decision notwithstanding substantial 
uncertainty concerning both the settlement’s treatment of their individual claims and 
their prospects for success at trial. 
3.  Claim Pool Flooding and Plaintiff Preferences 
Although frequently overlooked, repeat players’ methods for identifying and 
sweeping potential claimants into the proceedings can also have a profound impact 
on shaping the collective attitudes and preferences of the claim pool.  By shaping the 
composition of the claim pool, repeat players can alter the collective voice of the 
pool when seeking settlement approval.  This potential is most obvious where 
individual claims are objectively distinct—the preferences of a large group with one 
type of claim overwhelming the preferences of a much smaller group with a distinct 
type of claim—but it may also be present where differences of perception among 
plaintiffs with comparable objective profiles can be exaggerated and manipulated.   
To illustrate, assume three types of plaintiffs who were exposed to a known 
carcinogen produced by the same defendant.  Victim A has not been diagnosed with 
lung cancer but has been told that her chance of developing the disease increased 
from 9% to 12% due to her exposure.  Victim B has lung cancer but also smoked 
two packs of cigarettes a day for more than thirty years.  Victim C has a rare form of 
lung cancer, which experts have attributed primarily to exposure to the defendant’s 
product.  We may expect each plaintiff to have different perceptions of, and 
objectives within, the litigation and settlement of the case.  We may also expect 
these perceptions and objectives to guide their level of activity and decisions to 
approve or reject settlement.   
What we may not expect in this scenario is that Victim A, Victim B, and Victim 
C may refer to the same person.  This individual’s perception of her interest in the 
case is premised upon her realization of the depth of her injury and the 
                                                 
 82 Alison Lothes, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and 
Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 460 (2005) (“Culpability information 
is far more useful to a meritorious plaintiff because it has evidentiary value in proving her 
case.  On the other hand, culpability information is considerably less useful to plaintiffs with 
frivolous claims, since they are more likely to try to extract a quick initial settlement (as 
opposed to proceeding with litigation).”). 
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accountability of the defendant; and it may be based on incomplete information, the 
decision to emphasize one fact over another or the refusal to internalize information 
due to cognitive biases.  Thus, even if the plaintiff has a unique form of cancer that is 
attributable primarily to exposure to the defendant’s product, she may not appreciate 
the distinction or believe that the defendant caused it.  She may not sue, and, if she 
does, she may not have the same level of commitment to see the litigation to 
conclusion as she would if she had access to perfect information.    
This example highlights the vital role that a plaintiff’s perceptions play in 
guiding her litigation and settlement decisions.  Within the classic naming, blaming 
and claiming framework, we ask how injurious experiences become or do not 
become perceived (naming), are or are not transformed into grievances (blaming), 
and ultimately develop or do not develop into disputes (claiming).83  Each stage 
plays a critical role in the transformation of a dispute in traditional personal injury 
matters; the case will not arise, we are told, unless the victim perceives an 
experience as injurious, attributes fault to another, and decides to advance a claim.84   
Plaintiffs who do not perceive actual injuries and attribute them to the 
defendant’s conduct, however, may advance claims where they believe they will be 
paid under applicable law or settlement criteria.  This includes not only those who 
submit frivolous claims but also those who advance compensable claims.  Although 
the law may allow a lung cancer victim to sue Harold’s Auto Parts85 for selling 
asbestos-lined brakes, for example, she may have some difficulty accepting that 
Harold or his store were to blame for her injury.  Applicable law may allow 
consumers or workers to assert claims for unrealized economic or physical injuries, 
but any resulting payment may be viewed more as a windfall than compensation for 
an internalized wrong.  Such a disconnect between plaintiff perception and legal 
compensability may be particularly strong where, as in the United States, so much of 
the public views the civil litigation system as prone to accepting frivolous claims.86 
The divide between individual perception and compensability may be most 
significant where the damages are small or the purported injury-causing event is 
remote, speculative or just one of many possible causes. 87  Although some authors 
                                                 
 83 William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631 (1980-1981). 
 84 Id.; see also Markus Groth et al., Commitment to Legal Claiming: Influences of 
Attributions, Social Guidance, and Organizational Tenure, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 781, 782 
(2002) (noting the progression from one stage to the next). 
 85 This example is taken from the parties in Harold's Auto Parts, Inc., v. Mangialardi, 889 
So. 2d 493 (Miss. 2004). 
 86 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting 
the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 449-50 (2004) (discussing studies 
showing that more than four-fifths of the public believe that many meritless cases are filed in 
civil litigation). 
 87 For example, at the height of asbestos litigation screenings, it was not uncommon to 
hear reports of newly minted plaintiffs celebrating findings that they had compensable 
asbestos-related disease.  In one frequently cited article, a reporter at a screening in Missouri 
interviewed several prospective plaintiffs who appeared wholly unconcerned with their 
positive “diagnoses.”  See Andrew Schneider, Asbestos Lawsuits Anger Critics, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 2003, at A1 (noting that eighteen of the twenty merely saw the 
screening as “a way to add a little cash to their retirement funds”).  Similar attitudes were 
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have framed plaintiffs’ reluctance to sue in these matters as a product of rational 
claiming decisions,88 as their individual costs of litigation will exceed the expected 
gains, many of these potential plaintiffs should not reach the claiming stage in the 
first place.  Even if small or as yet unrealized injuries are acknowledged, they may 
not evoke a sufficient reaction to warrant more attention than the numerous 
annoyances and slights people confront every day. 
This disconnect is significant because the transformation of the plaintiff’s 
perspective not only plays a significant role in determining whether she will sue but 
also how committed she will be to doing so.  The degree to which a victim perceives 
the defendant’s conduct as wrongful influences her commitment to holding the 
defendant accountable throughout the litigation and settlement process, even where 
legal liability is not dependent upon fault.89  Likewise, a plaintiff’s perception of the 
breadth and depth of the harm caused by the defendant plays a significant role in 
shaping her commitment to demanding accountability through litigation rather than 
settlement.90  In sum, plaintiffs within a claim pool may be distinguishable not only 
on the basis of objective criteria but also by the degree to which they have 
internalized their injuries and attributed them to the wrongdoing of another.   
In some cases, the stark difference between claiming rates in traditional and 
aggregate litigation91 is not merely a product of increased publicity; it reflects the 
obvious distinction between those who have sufficient commitment to sue 
notwithstanding the obstacles and those who agree to sell litigation rights they may 
not value or perceive to be worth the trouble of litigation.  Indeed, there is little 
reason to believe that the practices used in these cases generate large volumes of 
traditional, high-commitment plaintiffs.  Thirty-second commercials and internet 
advertising do little more than advise that lawyers are looking for clients, and studies 
show that mass tort plaintiffs only rarely have direct contact with their lawyers,92 
                                                 
observed among some plaintiffs in the fen-phen case.  Andrew Wolfson, Woman Claims 
Lawyers Exaggerated Diet-Drug Injuries, COURIER-J., June 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing 
former paralegal’s testimony that clients were happy with echocardiogram readings that 
allegedly exaggerated their injuries “because it meant they were going to get more money”). 
 88 See, e.g., Campos, supra note 5; David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What 
Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 397-400 (2000); Robert G. 
Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529 (1997). 
 89 See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: 
How No-Fault and Tort Differ, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35 (1997) (discussing the 
significance of assigning fault to the claiming decision and finding that no-fault claimants’ 
primary motivation was to obtain compensation, while those who pursued tort litigation were 
motivated by the desire to hold the wrongdoer accountable or to obtain information about the 
circumstances of the injury). 
 90 See generally Gillian Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: 
Experiences With the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008). 
 91 McGovern, supra note 16, at 688 (“Unlike most torts where not every individual 
harmed seeks legal redress, mature mass torts generate an overabundance of plaintiffs through 
widespread publicity, including a substantial number of false positive claims.”). 
 92 Cramton, supra note 77, at 1919-93 (discussing client communication in mass tort); see 
also Weinstein, supra note 7, at 496-98 (discussing shortcomings of client communication 
where lawyers represent “hundreds or thousands of clients”). 
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much less receive sufficient counsel to overcome the numerous barriers to naming 
and blaming that have been identified.93  To the contrary, even if these 
advertisements may be viewed as reflecting potential compensability in litigation or 
settlement, poor public opinion of the ethics of lawyers who engage in dragnet 
recruiting and the manipulability of the legal system94 suggests that even those who 
sign up may not accept that they are injured or have been wronged by the defendant.  
And the fact that so many mass tort claimants appear to have low claiming 
commitment levels once they are signed suggests that the surge in new claims is not 
the product of increased naming and blaming.95 
On the other hand, aggregation and the methods used to build claim portfolios 
appear extremely effective at amassing passive claims.  Representing a large group 
of plaintiffs may provide the firm some advantage in obtaining a leadership role, but 
individual lawyers can still benefit from submitting the claims they control to any 
resulting global settlement regardless of their role in the case.96  Assuming they are 
at least prepared to do what is necessary to satisfy the pre-trial and settlement criteria 
established in the case,97 obligations that will be less demanding than preparing each 
claim for trial,98 there may be little practical downside to building a sizeable claim 
portfolio, particularly for those with reasonable prospects of obtaining an 
appointment to the steering committee or some other lucrative role in the case.  To 
the extent medical diagnoses are required, law firms tend to select the doctors, 
arrange the appointments and pay the doctors directly.99  And a plaintiff does not 
need a sufficient commitment to be actively involved in the case because only a few, 
if any, will be called on to litigate their claims fully. 
In so dramatically reducing the barriers to claiming, even those who have not 
named and blamed may find joining a claim pool worth the time and effort.  At the 
extreme, mass tort practice can transform some plaintiffs’ perceptions to the point 
that the process no longer resembles litigation at all.  As one asbestos plaintiff noted, 
“It’s better than the lottery. If they find something, I get a few thousand dollars I 
didn’t have.  If they don’t find anything, I’ve just lost an afternoon.”100   
When the claim pool is flooded with passive claimants, any vote or collective 
settlement acceptance of the claim pool is far more likely to reflect passive plaintiffs’ 
loss aversion than a rational assessment of the settlement by those who might be 
likely to sue otherwise. “[L]itigants, like decision-makers generally, evaluate 
                                                 
 93 See, e.g., Frederick C. Dunbar & Faten Sabry, The Propensity to Sue: Why do People 
Seek Legal Actions?, 42 BUS. ECON. 31, 31 (2007) (discussing numerous personal and social 
barriers to naming, blaming and claiming). 
 94 See Rhode, supra note 86, at 448. 
 95 See Brown, supra note 19, at 582-83 (2012) (discussing tendency of asbestos and silica 
claimants to withdraw claims when asked to submit modest additional documentation). 
 96 See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 53, at 16-18. 
 97 See Brown, supra note 19, at 612-17. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 585. 
 100 Andrew Schneider, Asbestos Lawsuits Anger Critics, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 
2003, at A1. 
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decision options relative to the current state of affairs and make risk-averse decisions 
when choosing between gains and risk-seeking decisions when choosing between 
losses.”101  Those who internalize the reality of their injuries and the defendant’s 
fault begin litigation with this reality framing their expectations.102 For these 
plaintiffs, any settlement proposal that is below expectations represents a loss to be 
avoided rather than a gain, while passive claimants who initially perceive any 
settlement as a windfall may see its potential rejection of the same settlement as a 
loss.103  The manner in which aggregate litigation sweeps in plaintiffs lends itself to 
creating claim pools that are not only more passive but also more risk-averse than 
traditional plaintiffs, so a facially democratic vote of the pool provides little 
assurance that the settlement reflects fair compensation for those who believe they 
have suffered a loss at the hands of the defendant.104   
In bankruptcy or other mandatory aggregation, dissatisfied plaintiffs’ only 
practical opportunity for voice—voting on any proposed plan—will be overwhelmed 
by the sheer volume of votes controlled by the lead firms.105  When global 
settlements are not mandatory, the effect can nonetheless be comparable.  The 
appearance of support from an overwhelming number of other plaintiffs may 
reinforce the prevailing vision of those who wish to pursue individual litigation as 
extortionists or self-indulgent holdouts.  Plaintiffs who might be inclined to pursue 
individual litigation standing alone will face considerable judicial and social pressure 
to conform to the preferences of the majority,106 and this pressure will be 
compounded by the presence of take it or leave it settlement terms, limited 
information concerning the settlement and their risks at trial, and aggressive efforts 
by lead counsel to sell the settlement to the claim pool. 
4.  Constraining Opt-Out Options 
As demonstrated in the Vioxx matter, the power to shape settlement terms—
including the power to delay or limit the power to opt-out or exit—is perhaps the 
                                                 
 101 See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 163, 167-68 (2000). 
 102 See John M.A. DiPippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 81, 99 (2001) (“[M]any plaintiffs may initially be risk-seeking 
because they may have framed the case as a loss and therefore be more willing to go through 
the difficult process of finding and consulting a lawyer.”). 
 103 See id. at 98 (“Thus, many plaintiffs might be initially risk-seeking because plaintiffs 
will frame their situation as a loss. They have already suffered some ‘damage.’  Unless they 
file a lawsuit, they face the certainty of never recovering anything for that loss.”).  Although 
some have suggested that frivolous plaintiffs are also risk seeking.  See Guthrie, supra note 
101 (assuming a traditional litigation framework where these actors have decided to claim 
notwithstanding the low probability of success).  As noted previously, however, mass 
aggregation promotes passive claiming regardless of the individual claimants’ litigation risk 
preference. 
 104 See DiPippa, supra note 102, at 98-99 (discussing how the barriers to claiming in 
traditional litigation weeds out risk-averse plaintiffs). 
 105 See S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the 
Asbestos Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 841, 858-60 (2008). 
 106 See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 90, at 667; Burch, supra note 7, at 90-91. 
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most obvious and direct manner in which lead counsel can coerce plaintiffs.  As the 
late Richard Nagareda noted in the class action context, the “settlement might try to 
make an offer that class members cannot refuse in the more sinister sense used in 
The Godfather: an offer that is no offer at all in practical terms but, rather, simply an 
illegitimate threat to leave class members with nothing in the event that they refuse 
the offer.”107  In the Vioxx settlement, such an “offer they can’t refuse” involved 
stripping plaintiffs who opted out of their counsel of choice.  In the Sulzer hip 
implant settlement, the designers used “a wily combination of a security interest and 
a trust fund to leave practically nothing from which opt-out claimants might 
recover.”108   
Moreover, even without express settlement terms that directly limit opt-out 
options, the inability to advance individual cases during the several months or longer 
that it may take to approve proposed settlements may also leave plaintiffs with little 
choice but to accept the global settlement or individual settlement of excluded 
claims.  Indeed, the Deepwater Horizon MDL settlements were conditioned on the 
stay of phase I bellwether trials and contemplated that related matters would not 
proceed pending consideration of the settlement.109  Such an exercise of power may 
have largely the same effect as a defendant’s scorched-earth litigation strategy; if 
justice delayed is justice denied, it makes little difference if the delay is caused by a 
recalcitrant tortfeasor or lead counsel whose MDL agenda forces the disempowered 
plaintiff to the backburner. 
5.  Political Considerations 
The attenuated relationships between attorneys and clients create significant 
obstacles to effective plaintiff monitoring, both of their individual lawyers and lead 
counsel.  Section 1407 does not address lead attorneys’ duties to MDL plaintiffs who 
are not their own clients, and the case law provides little guidance.110  Although they 
are clearly fiduciaries with respect to clients within their claim portfolios, “there is 
no evidence that lead attorneys look to their clients for instructions when deciding 
how to handle MDLs.”111  They do not consult with clients concerning which cases 
to advance as bellwethers or seek authority to negotiate settlement terms with the 
defendant.  Nor is there any evidence that they gauge the claim pool’s or their own 
client portfolio’s support for foregoing bellwether trials before agreeing to the terms 
of early global settlements, even in matters where the litigation may advance 
plaintiffs’ and the affected community’s other non-pecuniary interests. 
Most accounts of attorney-client conflict in aggregate litigation focus on the 
attorney’s financial interests in the immediate case, but the lawyers who ultimately 
                                                 
 107 Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damages Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to 
Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 144 (2003).   
 108 Id. 
 109 See Plaintiffs’ & BP’s Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for Preliminary 
Approval of Proposed Med. Benefits Class Action Settlement, Approval of Class Notice, & 
Related Matters at 39-40, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mexico, No. MDL 2179, ECF No. 6267, at 39-40 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2012).  
 110 Silver, supra note 38, at 1988. 
 111 Id. at 1986. 
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make the critical decisions in these cases are most often part of a relatively small 
group of repeat players in mass tort litigation.  This generates a conflict between the 
lawyer’s need to maintain or advance her position within the repeat player 
community and the duty to represent the best interests of at least some of her own 
clients.  If those interests are not shared, a lawyer who is faithful to her clients’ 
interests may be sanctioned by her peers not only in the instant case but also with 
respect to future appointments and common benefit fund distributions.112  
Conversely, disempowered lawyers with sufficient claim portfolios to block 
settlement may have strong incentives to challenge the settlement to discourage 
similar disempowerment in future cases.  Either scenario raises the prospect that the 
lawyer’s decisions will conflict with the interests of at least some of her clients.   
Ultimately, however, repeat player politics can be addressed without 
undermining cohesion.  Those lawyers who have both sufficient client pools to 
interfere with any global settlement and a history of doing so are easily identified 
and may be brought into the fold through common benefit work assignments and 
modifications to distributions from the common benefit fund.113  Conversely, lead 
counsel may propose or otherwise go along with defendant proposals that impose 
additional burdens on disempowered holdout lawyers.114   
D.  The Limited Checks on Domination 
1.  Plaintiff Oversight and Referrals 
Lead attorneys in multidistrict litigation are, in a very real sense, beyond the 
control of any plaintiffs, even those within their own claim portfolios.  Mass tort 
clients frequently do not have direct relationships and regular personal 
communication with the counsel they hired,115 much less the attorneys to whom their 
cases are referred for litigation.  It is simply not possible for lawyers to counsel and 
take direct and personal instruction from clients when one lawyer represents several 
thousand individuals in one matter.116  Much of the work of litigation occurs out of 
                                                 
 112 See, e.g., Lachance v. Harrington, 965 F. Supp. 630, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“[T]he 
incentives among plaintiff lawyers in the class action bar to maintain ties with their fellows in 
order to have a role in the next ‘big case’ cannot be overlooked.”); see also Transcript of 
Initial Pretrial Conference, In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-
md-01871-CMR, ECF No. 111, at 43-44 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2008) (leading MDL plaintiffs’ 
lawyer Daniel Becnel discussing lead counsel patronage appointments for common interest 
work in other multi-district litigation). 
 113 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 114 This may include, for example, requiring lawyers who oppose a proposed settlement to 
submit additional claim information or otherwise incur substantial additional costs.  See 
Brown, supra note 19, at 616 (discussing law firms’ contentions along these lines in the 
Bextra and Celebrex MDL proceedings); see also Silver & Miller, supra note 40. 
 115 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 494 (“Many of these lawyers do not maintain meaningful 
one-to-one contact with their clients, nor can they represent these people as individuals, each 
with his or her own needs and desires.  The client becomes no more than an unembodied 
cause of action.”). 
 116 In the World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation, for example, the judge concluded that 
the Napoli law firm was too conflicted to advise its clients on the details of the settlement.  In 
re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp.2d 184, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The 
[settlement agreement] was a long and complicated document of 104 pages and 20 exhibits 
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court and out of public view, meaning that the only party with both a duty to the 
client and sufficient knowledge of an attorney’s disloyalty will be the attorney.  On 
top of these difficulties in monitoring their own counsel, individual plaintiffs do not 
even have the power to oversee and demand loyalty from most, if any, of the 
numerous lawyers who staff leadership committees or perform common interest 
work within an MDL.117 
In addition, the repeat player effect may shift a critical check on disloyalty to 
clients—the belief that those who act against the interests of their clients will not 
obtain client referrals in the future—to a need to establish or reinforce the lawyer’s 
reputation within the repeat player community.  And the risk of such a is heightened 
where clients may be readily available without former client referrals, clients are 
unlikely to become aware of any disloyalty, and the perception of being a strong 
player in mass tort litigation may be a valuable tool in mass media and internet client 
advertising.   
2.  Judicial Oversight 
To protect the interests of litigants, MDL judges increasingly hold hearings to 
consider the fairness and adequacy of any global settlement, but it is severely limited 
in this context.  The hearing, of course, comes only after the deal is fully negotiated 
and difficult to rework and suffers from the same limitations found in class action 
fairness hearings.118  Even if there were reasonably objective criteria for accurately 
assessing the fairness of a given settlement,119 settlement proponents shape the 
judge’s knowledge of the relevant issues and, at this stage, have a shared interest in 
ensuring that the information advanced is uniformly favorable.120 Indeed, it is not at 
all clear that ostensible fairness hearings involve “any independent review of the 
fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the terms of the settlement or the process 
                                                 
containing approximately an additional 130 pages.  Normally, lawyers advise clients as to the 
meaning and consequences of a complicated document and are in turn authorized and 
instructed by their clients how to act on their behalves.  However, this model did not fit the 
mass tort litigation before me, with 9,000 Plaintiffs represented by a single law firm and 
numerous potential conflicts among them and between them and their law firm.”). 
 117 Accord Pope v. Rice, No. 04 Civ. 4171(DLC) 2005 WL 613085 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 
2005). 
 118 See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1993) (discussing the limits of judicial oversight in class actions). 
 119 See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory 
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1444-45 (2006) (noting scholarship supporting the view 
that “there are simply no objective criteria by which the judges can accurately assess either the 
value or the process of settlements.”); G. Donald Puckett, Note, Peering Into a Black Box: 
Discovery and Adequate Attorney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 1271, 1279 (1999); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lecture, The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. 
L. REV. 1257, 1270 (1995). 
 120 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991) ("Settlement hearings are typically pep rallies jointly 
orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel."). 
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that led to the agreement.”121 Finally, given the structural limitations of section 1407, 
the court’s authority to reject non-class settlements that are unfavorable to plaintiffs 
is limited.122   
Even where lawyers engage in dubious recruiting and settlement practices, 
judicial oversight is further limited by the dynamics of aggregate litigation.  MDL 
judges are not dependent on lawyers to bring high-profile cases to them as in other 
forms of aggregation,123 but they do depend on the extensive work that lawyers 
perform to make the cases run smoothly.124  Lawyers not only fund the plaintiffs’ 
side of the litigation but also control the networks that draw potential plaintiffs into 
the process, perform the work necessary to advance the case, and bring the claim 
pool together in settlement.  While judges have an interest in clearing these complex 
matters from their dockets—an interest reinforced by the emphasis on maximizing 
efficiency and prompt resolution in multidistrict litigation generally125—they also 
have an interest in protecting the integrity of the process.  Judges may take action 
where the misconduct is overt and their conduct is an obvious and direct violation of 
ethical rules or applicable law, but few of the distortions of the process identified fall 
neatly into these categories.   
Under the circumstances, the reluctance to take firm action against repeat players 
where the line between unethical conduct and aggressive representation is uncertain 
may be more a sign of appropriate judicial temperament than indifference.  We 
expect judges to act on established facts, not inferences and suspicions about the 
parties before them.  In aggregate litigation, where lawyers play such a central role, 
aggressive responses to perceived but uncertain misconduct can have a severe impact 
on the proceedings and the innocent plaintiffs whose interests are at stake. This 
dynamic suggests an answer to the question of why so few lawyers involved in the 
client recruiting and other mass tort scandals of the last decade have been 
                                                 
 121 Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 802 
(2010) (discussing the Vioxx settlement hearing and contrasting the limited review in that case 
and the Zyprexa case with a far more searching inquiring into these matters in Agent Orange). 
 122 See, e.g., Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial 
“Approval” and “Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 
(2011) (questioning judicial authority to approve or reject private settlements in multidistrict 
litigation); Willging & Lee, supra note 121, at 801 (“Neither the MDL statute nor the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure include any requirement that the court review a consolidated 
settlement, even an opt-in settlement negotiated by attorneys in the proceeding. The 
presumption is that the attorneys for the individual plaintiffs will represent the plaintiffs' 
interests adequately.”). 
 123 See generally LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) (discussing the dependency corruption that arises 
as a result of bankruptcy forum shopping). 
 124 The JPML guide for MDL judges advises judges, “You cannot manage an MDL entirely 
yourself.  To a large extent, you must rely upon lead counsel to assist you.”  MDL GUIDE, 
supra note 28, at 3. 
 125 See, e.g., Carter G. Phillips et al., Rescuing Multidistrict Litigation from the Altar of 
Expediency, 1997 BYU L. REV. 821, 832 (1997) (noting the extreme emphasis on judicial 
efficiency in multidistrict litigation). 
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sanctioned.126  And when judges have taken a more aggressive line, they have met 
with resistance and outrage from litigants, experts and the public.127 
IV.  THE PROBLEM OF REPEAT PLAYER DOMINATION 
Any first-year law student will be familiar with some of the basic functions and 
goals of tort law: compensation; deterrence; fairness; and administrative efficiency.  
And across these considerations, aggregative proceedings promise distinct 
advantages over individual litigation in mass harm matters.  Aggregation levels the 
playing field with defendants, who have intrinsic economic and other advantages in 
mass harm cases over any individual plaintiff, which, in turn, should promote 
compensation and deterrence.  A level playing field should better promote fairness—
allowing plaintiffs and defendants to obtain judgments or settlements based on merit 
rather than forcing outgunned and underfinanced plaintiffs to accept lowball 
settlement offers.   
As often becomes clear in first-year Torts and in practice, these goals “may 
actually often be in conflict with one another in application to real world events.”128  
One or more of the dimensions of deterring wrongful behavior—through subjecting 
the misconduct to public scrutiny, increasing the aggregate risk of liability, or 
otherwise—may conflict with plaintiffs’ individual or collective interests in 
compensation.  Efforts to make the process procedurally fair and transparent may be 
manipulated by a party to increase the costs of the process beyond the point that her 
adversary can rationally afford to continue with the litigation.  Conversely, 
procedures that are incredibly efficient may obtain this efficiency by cutting corners 
and relying on unjustified presumptions.  Trial by ordeal, for example, was far more 
efficient than modern civil litigation, yet nobody seriously suggests that a return to 
such a model of dispute resolution is desirable.   
At settlement, these questions may be viewed in the narrow terms of whether the 
proposed settlement effectively balances the objectives of substantive law.   In other 
words, what ends are advanced by the settlement, and who decides?  Structurally, 
section 1407 does not contemplate, much less expressly authorize, placing this 
decision in the hands of anyone other than the holders of the substantive rights at 
issue.129  As demonstrated in the preceding part, however, these questions are 
                                                 
 126 Brown, supra note 19, at 610. 
 127 For example, in the World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation, Judge Hellerstein’s 
efforts to ensure the fairness of the proposed settlement drew considerable condemnation from 
editorial boards, litigants and several scholars.  See, e.g., Editorial, Remember the Blindfold, 
Judge, N.Y. POST, Apr. 14, 2010, at 30 (criticizing Judge Hellerstein’s efforts to be more 
involved in shaping the settlement and characterizing his complaints (“I don’t know what’s 
going on [with the settlement]”) as “a temper tantrum of sorts”); John Riley, Judge 
Challenged on Ruling, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 15, 2010, at A6 (noting various attacks on 
Judge Hellerstein’s initial stance on the World Trade Center settlement); see also Grabill, 
supra note 48, at 146-53 (criticizing judicial review of MDL settlements generally and Judge 
Hellerstein’s approach in the World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation specifically). 
 128 DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (3d ed. 2006). 
 129 As Martin Redish noted in his critique of the class action device, “the class action was 
never designed as a freestanding legal device for the purpose of ‘doing justice,’ nor is it a 
mechanism intended to serve as a roving policeman of corporate misdeeds or as a mechanism 
by which to redistribute wealth.”  MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE 22 (2009).  
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ultimately left to the repeat players who control multidistrict proceedings.  Thus, this 
section focuses on the degree to which repeat players reflect plaintiffs’ interests in 
the proceedings, whether those repeat players who assume lead counsel roles are 
likely to be the best suited for striking this balance, and the impact of modern mass 
tort practice on the perceived legitimacy of the process. 
A.  Domination, Conflicts, and Competition 
If we assume that lead attorneys’ interests are aligned with plaintiffs’ interests, 
the fact that lead counsel set the agenda for the MDL—and, accordingly, define the 
common good to be pursued—should be of little concern.  Empowering these repeat 
players should level the playing field with defendants prior to settlement and provide 
sufficient cohesion across the claim pool to preclude plaintiff self-interest from 
undermining any settlement that is achieved.  In sum, empowering repeat players 
may be viewed as best ensuring that the purpose of applicable substantive law is 
achieved in settlement. 
Collectively, however, the layers of representation, referral and control are so 
complex that conflicts of interest may be inevitable.  As demonstrated, the modern 
framework sweeps a plaintiff into one firm’s portfolio, in which her interests may 
conflict with both the lawyer’s personal interests and the interests of others within 
that portfolio.  If this lawyer refers the cases to another attorney with more influence, 
similar conflicts with the second lawyer’s personal and portfolio majority’s interests 
may also be present.  When that lawyer is not among those controlling the direction 
of the case, there are yet more opportunities for personal and client majority/minority 
conflicts.  And, by this point, the plaintiff is so far removed from those making the 
critical decisions that will drive the case toward conclusion that her individual 
preferences will be of little concern to those making the decisions that drive the 
inexorable march toward global settlement. 
1.  The Failure of the Common Good Emphasis 
The disconnect between the interests of lead counsel and plaintiffs places a 
thumb on the scale in favor of prompt global settlement ahead of plaintiffs’ other 
interests in discovery and trial.  Of course, as others have noted previously, the 
lawyers who have invested considerable resources in the litigation may prefer to 
accept an early settlement that provides sufficient returns for her investment even if 
it fails to capture the full value of her clients’ claims.130  This risk can be particularly 
high where attorneys invest enormous sums in the litigation over a period of years.131  
Moreover, even where the plaintiffs’ non-pecuniary objectives—getting answers, 
                                                 
Similarly, nothing in section 1407 alters the fact that it, like the class action, “is nothing more 
than an elaborate procedural device designed to facilitate the enforcement of pre-existing 
substantive law” that is vested in plaintiffs rather than repeat players.  Id. 
 130 Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 941, 977-78 (1995). 
 131 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 196-98 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (discussing financial stress on one of the law firms in the case and concluding, “[t]he 
prospect of settlement and a fee of $250 million gave the firm an interest that may not have 
been in line with many of its clients' interests”); In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 
769 F. Supp. 2d 650, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing similar incentives generating a conflict 
for the only other law firm representing a large group of plaintiffs in the case). 
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holding those responsible accountable publicly for their actions, and shaping public 
and political discussion to avoid similar problems in the future—may be achieved 
through litigation, the power to shape the agenda toward prompt settlement may 
foreclose these options as a condition of settlement.  
With respect to compensation, even if the lawyer or lawyers who control the 
process share the interests of the claim pool with respect to increasing the size of the 
settlement, their own recoveries will also be dependent on how the fund is divided.  
Higher evidentiary barriers will increase the firms’ overhead and reduce the number 
of the claims they control that are ultimately compensable, even if these barriers 
more effectively distinguish good and bad claims.  Lead firms may also have an 
interest in maximizing claimant approval or acceptance through coercion132 rather 
than accommodating minority claimants’ needs and interests that may reduce their 
own claim portfolio’s recovery.  Collectively, these considerations demonstrate that 
lead counsels’ interests advancing the settlement are likely to be at odds with at least 
some of the plaintiffs within the claim pool.133   
Likewise, the belief that deterrence is improved by prompt global settlement is 
largely premised upon untested assumptions about the manner and degree to which 
different aspects of tort litigation may alter corporate behavior.  From a social 
welfare standpoint, even if we assume that the quasi-class action increases aggregate 
liability, it is far from clear that this effect improves deterrence.134  The murky 
parameters of this broader debate on the relationship between raw liability and 
deterrence are beyond the scope of this paper, but the dearth of empirical support for 
tort liability-centered deterrence should, at a minimum, suggest caution in framing 
aggregate litigation policy solely on accelerating and increasing aggregate settlement 
liability.   
This need for caution is further warranted by the potential for the settlement-
focused framework to cap defendants’ other perceived risks of civil litigation.  When 
plaintiffs express concern that defendants are merely writing checks to sweep their 
problems under the rug,135 they capture the range of risks to the defendant more 
accurately than a model focused solely on the raw financial costs that litigation and 
settlement entail.  The risks to decision makers and the enterprise alike may be more 
complex than the diversion of resources decision makers do not own.136  In criminal 
                                                 
 132 See infra Part III.B. 
 133 Accord Brown, supra note 105, at 907-09 (discussing the frequency of this form of 
conflict of interest in asbestos bankruptcies). 
 134 See generally Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, The Uneasy Case for Product 
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010).   
 135 See Rebecca Mowbray, BP Oil Spill Health Settlement Details are Still a Mystery, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 11, 2012 (noting plaintiff’s concerns that settlement might 
mean their stories would be “swept under the rug”); Harry R. Weber & Michael Kunzelman, 
BP, Plaintiffs Focus on Gulf Oil Spill Settlement, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 27, 2012 (quoting 
plaintiff’s concerns that the Deepwater Horizon MDL settlements would allow BP to simply 
“write a check to solve their problems”). 
 136 Kara Scharwath, BP Cuts a Deal on the Deepwater Horizon Spill, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Mar. 
6, 2012), http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/03/bp-cuts-deal-deepwater-horizon-spill/ (“For a 
company that is trying to move on from a disaster of such grand proportions, the decision to 
settle was a smart one.  It puts the money in the hands of the plaintiffs much more quickly 
than if the company were to have gone to trial, which certainly helps their perception of the 
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law, for example, it is recognized that fear of the reputational costs of a conviction 
may far exceed the threat of substantial monetary penalties in civil litigation,137 yet 
the reputational effects that may arise from harmful disclosures in civil litigation 
tend to be discounted in the direct economic liability analysis.   
For much the same reason companies fear criminal actions, defendants are 
frequently willing to pay more to settle a case where harmful discovery can be 
shielded from public scrutiny.138  When a company is buying peace in global 
settlement, they are buying not only a cap on litigation costs and liability but also on 
public attention to potentially ruinous revelations about the company’s wrongdoing.  
This may allow counsel to increase the aggregate settlement amount by some portion 
of the monetary value of secrecy to the defendant,139 but it also allows defendants to 
avoid potentially catastrophic public relations fallout and constant public reminders 
of the harm they have caused.140  In the process, an early settlement may unduly limit 
policy discussions concerning the specific events and processes that gave rise to the 
injurious event.  In this respect, the degree to which early mass settlement transforms 
civil litigation into a complex business transaction can have a perverse effect on 
deterrence. 
The precise effect of negative publicity on deterrence is difficult to quantify, and 
the degree to which early settlement may undermine this effect will vary from case 
to case.  Discussions of this form of deterrence are grounded more in speculation and 
anecdotes than empirical evidence.  Moreover, it is difficult to say how much, if any, 
                                                 
company.  And by avoiding a lengthy, dramatic trial, BP can protect it’s image and keep 
damaging headlines off the front page.”). 
 137 See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 271, 280 (2008) ("The perception that the reputational consequences of a conviction 
could exceed even the substantial monetary penalties in any parallel civil litigation can explain 
why firms under investigation for criminal violations are willing to do almost whatever it 
takes--including waiving attorney-client privilege, assisting the government's prosecution of 
their senior officers, and paying millions of dollars in civil fines—to avoid an indictment."). 
 138 William G. Childs, When the Bell Can’t Be Unrung: Document Leaks and Protective 
Orders in Mass Tort Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 565, 571 and n.17 (2008) (“[T]he possibility of 
keeping documents secret—both ‘bad documents’ and marginally confidential but valuable 
documents—no doubt can affect the ability of plaintiffs to settle cases and the amount for 
which cases will settle.  Put more bluntly, defendants will pay more to keep bad documents 
secret.”). 
 139 Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 
979, 981-82 (2010). 
 140 As Shavell and Polinsky acknowledge, manufacturers are clearly motivated to avoid 
declines in product sales that would result from the perception that their products cause injury. 
Shavell & Polinsky, supra note 134, at 1439; see also Deborah A. Lilienthal, Litigation Public 
Relations: The Provisional Remedy of the Communications World, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
895, 897-98 (1999-2000) (“Many defendants recognize that they must be concerned with 
opinion outside the courtroom as well as inside.  In fact, negative public opinion may impact a 
company more than an adverse legal decision.  After all, if a company cannot pay its 
judgment, it can seek bankruptcy protection.  If, on the other hand, the public believes your 
product is unsafe, that you are dishonest, that your business practices are unjust, no code, case 
law or judge can protect your client's market share, brand name, reputation, or credibility in 
the court of public opinion.”). 
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tort litigation adds to this form of deterrence when the injurious events at issue are 
already in the public eye due to extensive public and media interest.  And given that 
so many traditional civil litigation cases settle as well, it may be that aggregation 
does no more than preserve a defendant’s expectation of controlling the public 
relations fallout in tort litigation.  This is not to say the effect plays a marginal role in 
deterring undesirable conduct ex ante; it merely reflects the difficulty in identifying 
what truly drives decision makers to modify their behavior and the extent to which 
aggregation merely suffers from the same shortcomings of traditional civil litigation.   
2.  Repeat Player Expertise and Plaintiffs’ Interests 
The “political convention mentality that currently prevails in MDLs”141 can 
generate conflicts with the interests of the claim pool.  Even if we assume that 
politically-motivated appointments and assignments are valuable inasmuch as they 
may promote cooperation among counsel and discourage strategic dissent by firms 
controlling large claim portfolios, the use of such assignments as a means of 
fostering loyalty to the collective interests of the leadership may come at the expense 
of zealous representation of the attorney’s clients’ interests.142  At the same time, the 
danger in political appointments is that lawyers who may be better suited to specific 
roles due to experience, quality of work, ability to contain costs or otherwise are 
passed over to accommodate lawyers who are simply better politicians or have more 
effective networks for amassing large claim portfolios.143 
In the Vioxx case, for example, the Motley Rice firm argued that the bellwether 
cases it prepared for trial were “pushed aside” by influential counsel in favor of their 
own cases.144  In response, the Fee Allocation Committee argued that it was “familiar 
with the Motley Rice firm, the quality of their work and the efficiency of their 
lawyers” and accused the firm of overbilling.145  Following the special master’s 
                                                 
 141 Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict 
Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2002 (2011). 
 142 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 143 Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1593, 1623-25 (2008) (discussing the risk that the post-Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) 
class actions and non-class aggregation will favor “dominant players on the plaintiff’s side” 
and the role of networks and “connections” in obtaining appointments). 
 144 Motley Rice's Objection to the Vioxx Fee Allocation Comm.'s Common Benefit Fee 
Recommendation, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 7 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 
2011).  As Charles Silver noted: 
In other words, Motley Rice contends that, when selecting Vioxx cases for bellwether 
trials, the lead attorneys were more concerned about fattening their lodestars than 
maximizing the value of plaintiffs' claims.  I do not know whether this is true, but I 
can say that the allegation is plausible because the lodestar method, which rewards 
time expended, creates perverse incentives. . . .  Motley Rice's complaint is plausible 
because judges base common benefit fee awards in MDLs on time expended and 
hourly rates. 
Silver, supra note 141, at 2002. 
 145 Indeed, in response, the committee criticized Motley Rice’s work on the matter.  Fee 
Allocation Comm.’s Response to Objections to Recommended Common Benefit Fee 
Allocation, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 13 (Mar. 4, 2011) (“The Fee 
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hearing on the matter, the Fee Allocation Committee increased the size of Motley 
Rice’s proposed allocation from $195,000 to $1,250,000, which was approved by the 
special master and the court.146   
Although Motley Rice’s perception of the reasons for the strategic decision to 
litigate other cases ahead of its own may not be entitled to deference, it is easy to see 
how these decisions can be tainted by the lead firms’ own self-interest.  At the same 
time, if the lead lawyers are indeed familiar with Motley Rice and have such a 
negative view of their work and efficiency, the decision to have them do any work at 
all—much less increase their compensation by more than one million dollars—is 
perplexing.  Regardless of how one evaluates the arguments advanced by the lawyers 
in the heat of a bitter fee dispute, it reinforces that the manner in which lead firms 
assign, manage and oversee the compensation for other lawyers involved in common 
benefit work can be tainted by political considerations that are not consistent with 
the best interests of the claim pool or the lawyers whose fees will be taxed to 
compensate others for that work. 
To be clear, although quid pro quo understandings and agreements among repeat 
players may arise from time to time, the same effect can be observed even in the 
absence of such an express understanding.  Where lawyers play an active role in 
selecting other lawyers to serve on the steering committee or perform other common 
interest work, these decisions may be framed by the participants’ desires to build 
loyalty and relationships across cases.  Although courts have acknowledged some of 
these concerns and taken a more active role in selecting counsel for leadership 
roles,147 they nonetheless look to the firms’ respective influence within the mass tort 
bar when making key appointments.148  To that end, a firm’s skillful leveraging of its 
position in a case may be seen as essential to build the support and influence 
necessary to obtain desirable positions in future cases.149   
In sum, the perceived need to ensure cohesion among the members of the mass 
tort bar within a case tends to reward political savvy over legal skill, diligent 
                                                 
Allocation Committee is familiar with the Motley Rice firm, the quality of their work and the 
efficiency of their lawyers.  Therefore, the Committee concluded that these time records were 
likely reconstructed and reflected an overestimate of the time actually worked.”).   
 146 See Order & Reasons, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 1657, at 108 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 9, 2011). 
 147 Order & Reasons, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 3, n.4 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 19, 2010) (“[T]he selection of lead counsel by their fellow attorneys would involve 
intrigue and side agreements which would make Macbeth appear to be a juvenile manipulator.  
Frequently, recommendations by attorneys for positions on leadership committees are 
governed more on friendship, past commitments and future hopes than on current issues.”).   
 148 Id. (noting that “the efficient and successful resolution of an MDL is dependent on 
coordination and cooperation of lead counsel for all sides” and requires lawyers who have 
demonstrated sufficient “diplomatic skills to coordinate the efforts of a diverse group”). 
 149 Accord Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts—Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228, 
1232 (1995) (discussing the need to “parlay the small favors and back scratching of a series of 
class-action cases into a position of influence and sizable fees in a future class action of one's 
own”).  Although Wolfram discussed this back scratching in the class action context, this 
gamesmanship is equally critical in modern MDL practice given the current approach to 
selecting firms for leadership and other roles. 
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assessment of plaintiffs’ preferences and objectives in litigation and settlement, and 
restraint in amassing and awarding common benefit funds.  This does not mean that 
those who obtain leadership positions or common benefit work necessarily lack 
sufficient competence to perform their work effectively, but it does caution against 
blind confidence that the choices made by lead counsel will reflect plaintiffs’ 
individual or collective best interests.     
3. Competition and Distortion of the Mass Tort 
As noted in Part II.A., the competition that underlies modern mass tort recruiting 
fuels the rapid growth of the modern mass tort following a triggering event.  Within 
five months of the Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, BP had been 
named in an estimated three hundred civil lawsuits across the country involving tens 
of thousands of plaintiffs, with many consolidated in a federal MDL.150  Likewise, 
within a few months after a widely publicized “unintended acceleration” accident 
killed four people and caused Toyota to recall 3.8 million vehicles, more than one 
hundred lawsuits against the company were filed and consolidated in another federal 
MDL.151   In a far less publicized matter, competing firms had already recruited 
several hundred clients and moved for the creation of an MDL less than one month 
after DePuy’s recall of two hip replacement products and public commitment to 
cover all of the costs associated with the recall in August 2010.152  In sum, whatever 
role maturity may still play in some cases, other events are more likely to trigger 
mass client solicitation today. 
How do we account for such a shift?  Representing a large group of plaintiffs 
may provide the firm some advantage in obtaining a leadership role,153 and those 
who do not obtain such appointments may nonetheless leverage their portfolios to 
demand additional concessions for themselves or their clients.  At this stage, it is 
sufficient to identify those who fit the basic profile and add their potential claims to 
the portfolio;154 which not only provides the lawyer with practical control over the 
claim but also prevents competitors from obtaining them and precludes defendants 
                                                 
 150 See John Schwarz, U.S. Judge in New Orleans Will Hear Gulf Spill Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2010, at A11. 
 151 See Transfer & Order, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, 
Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2151 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010) (ordering 
consolidation of eleven class actions and more than one hundred other personal injury and 
economic loss lawsuits pending against Toyota arising out of alleged “unintended 
acceleration”). 
 152 DePuy issued a recall of its ASR hip replacement devices on August 24, 2010.  In 
re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 
MDL No. 2244 (J.P.M.L. May 24, 2011).  Plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a motion to consolidate 
litigation concerning the devices on September 3, 2010, and the JPML ordered consolidation 
in the Northern District of Ohio on December 7, 2010.  See Transfer Order, In re DePuy 
Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2197 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 3, 
2010). 
 153 See, e.g., NAGAREDA, , supra note 53, at 16-18; see also McCollam, supra note 31. 
 154 Brown, supra note 19, at 593-95. 
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from settling with them prematurely.155  Assuming they are at least prepared to do 
what is necessary to satisfy the pre-trial and settlement criteria established in the 
case,156 obligations that will be less demanding than preparing each claim for trial,157 
there may be little practical downside to building a sizeable claim portfolio. 
Under the accelerated aggregation and settlement model, the aggressive 
recruiting practices that have plagued some mature mass torts come at the beginning 
of the case.  In the Deepwater Horizon MDL, for example, several victims who 
attempted to submit claims to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility were surprised to 
discover that they had ostensibly agreed to representation by counsel.158  Likewise, 
after the threatened demise of asbestos litigation triggered a rush to file silicosis 
claims, thousands of asbestos plaintiffs were “recycled” as silicosis plaintiffs.159  
Similarly dubious recruiting and development practices have been identified in the 
other cases.160   
Defense lawyers, who also tend to be frequent repeat players in these cases, are 
well aware of the degree to which plaintiffs’ lawyers may recruit and litigate claims 
in ways that conflict with broader norms.  The transformation from civil litigation 
from a battle between the weak and powerful to aggregate litigation among largely 
equal—and equally imperfect—institutional repeat players provides opportunities for 
defendants even as it may level the playing field in court.  To that end, defense 
firms’ client development materials tend to highlight not only their legal skill but 
also their experience in identifying and exploiting these conflicts161 for good reason:  
emphasizing the corruption of the plaintiffs’ bar may shift prospective juror and 
broader public attention away from the defendant’s own actions in ways that 
advance their clients’ interests. 
Combined with the defense narratives concerning the impact of frivolous 
litigation on job creation, retirement security and global competition; it is easy to see 
how defendants have been successful in altering public opinion in some mass tort 
                                                 
 155 Once a party is represented by counsel, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
precludes opposing counsel from communicating about the matter with the client without 
consent.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2012) (Opposing counsel “shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”).  Judge Weinstein noted this 
limitation as an issue in the Dalkon Shield case and other evidence of this rule undermining 
client access to information.  See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 496-97. 
 156 Brown, supra note 19, at 612-17. 
 157 Id. 
 158 McCollam, supra note 31 (interviewing numerous victims who were misled into signing 
retention agreements or claimed they never retained anyone as counsel). 
 159 Brown, supra note 19, at 581. 
 160 Id. at 583-86. 
 161 See Kirk Hartley, Big Law Now Marketing Defense of Global Tort Litigation, and 
Adopting the Insurance Industry Tactic of Marketing a Theme of Fraud, GLOBALTORT (Dec. 
17, 2010), http://www.globaltort.com /2010/12/big-law-now-marketing-defense-of-global-
tort-litigation-and-adopting-theinsurance-industry-tactic-of-marketing-a-theme-of-fraud/) 
(discussing mass tort defense firms’ marketing tactics).  
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cases.  Even in Libby, Montana—a community that has been plagued by more 
asbestos personal injuries per capita than any other—the specious claiming practices 
that historically dominated asbestos litigation have contributed to community 
sentiment against not only the litigation but also those victims who advance 
legitimate claims in litigation.162  Documented evidence of claim manufacturing in 
the South American banana plantation proceedings have likewise been largely 
effective at shifting the focus from the defendant’s widespread use of dangerous 
pesticides to the perceived greed of the lawyers and plaintiffs involved.163   
Moreover, where defendants actually discover strong evidence of misconduct or 
manipulation, they may enjoy additional leverage in efforts to reduce their aggregate 
liability.  In the aforementioned Silica MDL, for example, defendants successfully 
identified numerous obvious abuses with respect to the medical and other evidence 
supporting large blocks of silicosis claims.164  Even though individual silicosis 
claims have been advanced for decades, the conclusion that such a substantial 
majority of the claims were “manufactured for money”165 tainted the entire claim 
pool and continues to haunt true victims’ efforts to pursue their rights today. 
In transforming the popular perception of civil litigation from a means of 
advancing justice into a mechanism devoted primarily, if not exclusively, on 
transferring resources, the perception of tort law has also been transformed from a 
means of empowering the weak and injured to a mechanism for one group of 
powerful elites (the controlling lawyers) to transfer wealth to no one so much as 
themselves.166  The success of this transformation is as much a product of 
aggregation’s focus on wealth redistribution, empowering lawyers at the expense of 
individual plaintiffs’ voice and exit options, and the systemic reluctance to reign in 
entrepreneurial litigation practices as any orchestrated campaign by defendants.  The 
problem is not so much that defendants are exploiting their rights to highlight any 
distortions they uncover; it is that the practices that define entrepreneurial mass tort 
plaintiffs’ practice and weaknesses in modern mass tort governance encourage these 
distortions and make the defendants’ task too easy. 
B.  Plaintiff Rights, Attorney Dominance, and Legitimacy 
As suggested previously, the acceleration of claim recruiting and filing, 
discovery and settlement under the quasi-class action model may generate a 
                                                 
 162 Heather Orom et al., A Typology of Communication Dynamics in Families Living a 
Slow-Motion Technological Disaster, 33 J. FAM. ISSUES 1299, 1310-16 (Oct. 2012) (noting 
community and family criticism that tracks broader criticism concerning the merits of asbestos 
litigation and generates doubts about the truthfulness and integrity of individual claimants). 
 163 See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, Litigation Fraud Allegations Hotly Disputed in Dole 
Banana Case, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 1, 2010. 
 164 In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Accord John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 603 (2005) (“[T]he 
relentless monetization of redress has arguably introduced pathologies, including the 
commodification of injuries, and the transformation of some plaintiffs' lawyers from victim-
representatives to injury entrepreneurs.”). 
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“distorted”167 life cycle for a mass tort.  Plaintiffs who may have had the will and 
support necessary to advance their cases to conclusion in the absence of multidistrict 
consolidation—the same type of plaintiffs whose litigation uncovered the far-
reaching misconduct of the asbestos industry—will find them delayed and more 
difficult to advance successfully.  The maturity promised by the aggressive litigation 
of their rights may be replaced with pre-mature settlements based on repeat player 
preferences.   
The practical effect is a transformation from appropriately adversarial civil 
litigation to a process structured to value the litigation rights that will inevitably be 
sold.168  The pretrial work of multidistrict litigation is frequently characterized as 
establishing or aiding lead counsel and defendants in establishing rough values for 
the claims to be settled.169  In any matrix-based settlement, these efforts will allow 
defendants and lead counsel to distinguish those rights—the goods—to be sold from 
those that will be treated as non-conforming and rejected.  The global settlement 
agreement captures these terms, subject only to the approval of the true owners of 
the rights, which may be achieved through coercion, controlling the information 
available to plaintiffs and drowning out dissent through flooding the claim pool.  To 
the extent that “aggregate settlements derive their legitimacy from client 
autonomy,”170 the coercive force of aggregate practice and quasi-class action 
settlement171 render them substantively suspect even if they preserve some technical 
conception of autonomy. 
Even where the rough presumption that aggregation improves total recovery 
holds true in practice, “tort law is not simply a device for transferring wealth, and 
good lawyers are not simply maximizers of average payout.”172  Compensation and 
deterrence are valuable social ends of tort law, but “the claim tort law provides 
against the tortfeasor is not precisely a means to that end.”173  The power to control 
the litigation, including the initial decision to pursue litigation at all, belongs and 
remains with the client.  And to “lose the right to decide whether to settle one's 
                                                 
 167 Frances E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821 
1844 (1995) (noting that such premature consolidations may “perpetuate a distorted version of 
a mass tort”). 
 168 Others have drawn similar observations concerning global mass tort settlements.  See 
generally William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 
413 (2001); accord, L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class 
Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 163 (2004) 
(discussing the potential for collusive settlements in the mass tort settlement context). 
 169 See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
bellwether trials “can be beneficial for litigants who desire to settle such claims by providing 
information on the value of the cases as reflected by the jury verdicts”); Fallon, supra note 46, 
at 2342 (“[B]ellwether trials essentially supply counsel with ‘raw’ data around which a more 
fair and equitable grid-based compensation system can ultimately be constructed.”). 
 170 Erichson, supra note 21, at 530 n.40. 
 171 Peter Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 941, 977-78 (1995). 
 172 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 62, at 312. 
 173 Id. 
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claim, and on what terms, is to lose control of that claim in a very real sense.”174  
Placing these decisions in the hands of predictable repeat players may accelerate 
resolution, but this efficiency comes at the cost of denying plaintiffs access to 
digestible and unbiased information, independent and loyal representation and 
meaningful opportunities for voice and exit. 
If we assume that all plaintiffs really want in litigation is compensation, then 
aggregation holds far more promise than leaving individual plaintiffs to their own 
devices. This assumption, however, presumes more than the available information 
can establish.175 As one commentator noted recently, compensation alone fails “to 
heal the deep wounds of many clients.”176  Dr. Tamara Relis likewise recently 
observed that “the bulk of lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants have similar 
conceptions of why plaintiffs have sued in a particular case—the reason being solely 
or predominantly for money” while “claimants desires for acknowledgments of 
harm, retribution for defendant conduct, admissions of fault, prevention of 
reoccurrences, answers and apologies remain invisible to most lawyers throughout 
the litigation and mediation of these cases.”177  Indeed, although a majority of the 
traditional tort plaintiffs in the Relis study identified compensation as at least a 
secondary goal of litigation, less than one quarter of the plaintiffs identified 
compensation as their primary (18%) or sole (6%) objective in the case.178 
As in class action litigation, passive plaintiff majorities “appear to be behaving 
out of apathy or rational ignorance rather than making a considered choice not to opt 
out or object.”179  There may be an “overwhelming market demand for en masse 
representation”180 among these plaintiffs, but this passive majority is so readily 
manufactured in modern practice that it tells us little about how those with 
internalized injuries and a firm commitment to vindicating their rights assess the 
litigation and settlement.  Moreover, this simple majority preference neither justifies 
the wholesale coercive surrender of individual rights nor the characterization of 
                                                 
 174 Id. at 313. 
 175 See Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation 
for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 
355, 378 (2003) (“For example, in cases concerning widespread worker exposure to asbestos, 
liability for a particular person's injuries is sometimes determined without a hearing, using 
answers to a questionnaire regarding exposure to asbestos.  The courts use this approach to 
distribute settlements to large groups of victims quickly.  However, instead of gratefully 
receiving their rapid settlements, injured parties have been angered by the denial of their ‘day 
in court.’  In other words, an effort by the judicial system to reform in order to better meet the 
needs of the public has not been successful due to an inaccurate understanding of what people 
really want in this situation.”); Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement 
of Mass Tort Claim, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 199-205 (1990). 
 176 Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 
1136 (2000). 
 177 Tamara Relis, "It's Not About the Money!": A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs' 
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 706-07 (2007). 
 178 Id. at 723. 
 179 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class 
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1563 (2004). 
 180  David Rosenberg, supra note 88, at 428. 
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those who choose to advance individual cases as “self-indulgent”181 or 
extortionists.182  Even if we accept that some of those who insist upon taking a 
different course have nefarious motives or are falling prey to lawyers advancing their 
own agendas, it is a stunning logical leap to presume that all that reject the 
majority’s preference are so morally bankrupt or easily manipulated.   
The reaction of the relatives of those killed in the World Trade Center to the 9/11 
Victims Compensation Fund (VCF) provides a vivid reminder of the value of these 
rights in the mass tort context.  Viewed purely from a compensation standpoint, the 
VCF was exceptional—promising “a fast, guaranteed payment . . . comparable to 
what they might recover if they won in court”183 —so much so that “most expected 
them to accept the offer in droves.”184  In spite of these benefits, many of those 
eligible for compensation were reluctant to participate and delayed claim filing until 
shortly before the deadline.185   
Although others suggested a variety of explanations for the reluctance to file, a 
study conducted by Gillian Hadfield showed that “the choice between accepting a 
payment from the Fund and going to court was not exclusively, or even primarily, 
framed as a financial calculation.”186  For many of these claimants, the decision: 
involved not an easy trade-off between a guaranteed dollar payment and a 
gamble on a “pot of gold,” but a deeply troubling trade-off between 
money and a host of nonmonetary values that respondents thought they 
might obtain from litigation.  These values included information from 
otherwise inaccessible sources (the decision makers who determined 
airline and World Trade Center fire safety procedures, for example), 
accountability in the sense of public judgment about whether those on 
                                                 
 181 Id. 
 182 As Erichson and Zipursky noted in discussing the Vioxx settlement: 
[A]nother suggestion here requires careful examination: the charge of extortion—the 
suggestion that those refusing to settle their claims are obviously merely manipulative 
hold-outs, that these claimaints must recognize proposed settlements as perfectly 
acceptable and desirable and, by holding out, are simply trying to squeeze more out of 
the defendant at the cost of everyone around them. . . .  It would be naive to deny that 
some allegedly reluctant claimants are like this, but we find no reason to suppose that 
only a manipulative claimant would reject the settlement agreement.  Claimants have 
different risk tolerances, different litigation objectives, different satisficing levels, and 
different evaluations of the strength of their own claims.  Moreover, settlements treat 
claimants differently, leaving some better compensated than others.  Claimants may 
place different values on certainty and may differ in their evaluation of the certainty 
that settlement provides.  On the facts of Vioxx, the claimants had very little sense of 
how much money they would obtain from a settlement.  There is good reason to think 
that some of them genuinely wanted to take Merck to trial rather than accept an utterly 
indefinite settlement. 
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 62, at 318. 
 183 Hadfield, supra note 90, at 645-46. 
 184 Id. at 646. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
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whom victims depended for their safety did their jobs, and responsive 
policy change—making sure that lessons were learned and heeded in the 
future.187 
Hadfield’s study provides a stark example of the popular perception of civil 
litigation rights.  That victims prized their rights to litigate is evident not only in their 
reluctance to sacrifice the rights but also in the way that they framed this reluctance.  
These rights represented the potential for compensation in tort, but they also 
represented the ability to serve their communities in a unique way.188  When faced 
with the choice of ensuring compensation that was comparable to what they would 
receive in tort or retaining the right, even those with compelling personal needs for 
compensation struggled with the decision and were “heartbroken and ashamed”189 
when they capitulated to the certainty of the VCF.190  Hadfield concluded that civil 
litigation rights represented more to these victims “than a means to satisfying private 
material ends; it represents principled participation in a process that is constitutive of 
a community.”191 
Although it may be tempting to characterize the ultimately high participation 
rates with the fund as “a widespread endorsement of money over litigation or an 
ultimate acceding to the financial frame offered by Congress, VCF personnel, and 
the legal profession,” the study directly undermines these characterizations.192  As 
Hadfield noted, “Many felt that they had been bought off, induced to forego 
litigation in order to protect the government, the airlines, or other corporate 
entities.”193  And a “significant majority of respondents felt that it was wrong that the 
VCF design required them to waive their right to pursue civil litigation as a 
condition of receiving money through the VCF.”194 
The reality that awaits victims in quasi-class multidistrict litigation is, as noted, 
more likely to resemble the compelled acceptance of such a “payoff” than the 9/11 
victims’ idealized vision of civil litigation.  And though the vast majority of 
respondents “felt that the limitation of liability, the effort to prevent lawsuits, and the 
requirement that victims and their families choose between money and lawsuits were 
                                                 
 187 Id. at 647-48. 
 188 Id. at 661 (concluding that many saw their litigation rights as a uniquely powerful tool 
for gaining an understanding of what went wrong and why, so that we might “change things to 
prevent this from happening again”).  As Hadfield noted, “the choice as they saw it was it was 
about relinquishing gold in favor of something they saw as more important,” even though they 
knew they faced an uphill battle in court.  Id. at 662. 
 189 Id. at 663. 
 190 Id. at 665 (finding that a majority of respondents who ultimately submitted claims to the 
VCF found it “somewhat” or “very” hard to do so, with these decisions frequently “driven by 
a capitulation to reality and brute facts”). 
 191 Id. at 648-49. 
 192 Id. at 667. 
 193 Id. at 668. 
 194 Id. 
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steps no future Congress should take,”195 these are steps that quasi-class actions 
demand in the largest mass tort cases.   
Collectively, the exclusion of plaintiffs’ voices, dominance of lead counsel, and 
negative perceptions of the practices employed by some of these entrepreneurial 
lawyers undermines the long-term legitimacy of the quasi-class action model.  The 
irony in the efforts to transform multidistrict litigation into a quasi-class action is 
that it exaggerates the features of class action practice that served as the core talking 
points in building support for the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).196  And though 
multidistrict consolidation may never draw the same attention of the special interests 
that successfully lobbied for CAFA, the political effort to limit class actions was 
viable only because these talking points rung true with the public.  While CAFA 
may have marked an important legislative shift in class action practice, the battle 
over the public’s perception of the legitimacy of the class action device appears to 
have been lost long before CAFA.197 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSALS, AND LIMITATIONS 
The problem with mass tort aggregation is not so much that it wholly supplants 
traditional civil litigation; it is that it captures many of traditional litigation’s 
weaknesses and introduces new ones.  Although individual plaintiffs in traditional 
civil litigation frequently defer to the expertise and advice of counsel, they retain the 
power to control and guide their own cases.  In empowering a select group of 
lawyers to control multidistrict proceedings, the preceding demonstrates that 
plaintiffs are neither individually nor collectively empowered to exert control over 
critical collective decisions in a similar fashion.  They have no meaningful voice in 
matters that are relevant to the disposition of their claims, and their exit options are 
effectively limited.   
The question, then, is how to empower plaintiffs without undermining the 
efficiencies of aggregation.  Empowering every plaintiff to opine on every step, 
evaluate every confidential document and deposition, or effectively veto any global 
settlement would mark a descent into chaos.  Class actions ostensibly address this 
concern by designating one or more representative plaintiffs, but the characteristic 
that defines the need for multidistrict rather than class treatment—substantial 
variations within the claim pool—also suggests that purely representative 
governance will fail to capture the objective claim distinctions and subjective 
                                                 
 195 Id. at 669. 
 196 Erichson, supra note 143, at 1596-1602. 
 197 As Professor Lahav noted in 2003,  
The pervasive criticisms against class actions—which fall mostly in the lap of 
plaintiffs’ side class action attorneys—are damaging to the legal profession and to 
the regulatory purpose of the class action mechanisms.  Commentators who 
oppose class action litigation often point to lawyer control as the reason for 
eliminating class actions.  Studies and opinion polls have found that the public 
believes that lawyers are greedier and more dishonest than other professionals.  
The bad press concerning class action litigation has not helped this image.  
Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 
74 n.31 (2003). 
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preferences of the plaintiffs.  In sum, plaintiff empowerment may sound nice in 
theory, but it promises to be exceptionally difficult in practice. 
To address this question, this Part proposes a framework for collective voice and 
oversight that mirrors the approach used in complex corporate bankruptcy 
proceedings.  As in multidistrict litigation, these proceedings tend to involve 
creditors with diverse and conflicting individual interests, limited incentives for 
individual creditors to monitor and police the proceedings on their own, and a high 
potential for repeat players to assume control over the case in a manner that 
undermines the interests of the claim pool.  Although this proposal is complicated by 
the obvious distinctions between complex bankruptcy and mass tort proceedings, it 
nonetheless provides a useful starting point for resolving the problems that arise in a 
system that marginalizes plaintiffs.  
A.  A Model for Collective Voice in Quasi-Class Action 
1.  Creditors’ Committees in Chapter 11 
At its core, bankruptcy is a straightforward common pool problem: the 
bankrupt’s creditors have both a shared interest in maximizing the size of the 
debtor’s assets available for distribution and antagonistic interests in maximizing 
their individual distributions from those assets.  If these creditors remain free to 
pursue whatever recourse is available to them outside of bankruptcy, history 
demonstrates that creditors will “race to the courthouse” to advance their individual 
interests even if the collective impact of this race is to reduce their aggregate returns.  
Thus, if bankruptcy law is to achieve whatever vision of equitable distribution it is 
designed to advance, it must curtail creditors’ self-help options. 
The bankruptcy structure provides a vehicle for creditors to express their 
collective voice—by way of one or more official committees comprised of creditors 
selected by the Office of the United States Trustee—throughout the bankruptcy case.  
These committees may exercise a level of influence over the proceedings that few 
individual creditors can match, even if the individual creditors have the resources 
and resolve to do so.  At the same time, individual creditors are expressly authorized 
to object to any matter that affects their interests, may be authorized to proceed with 
their individual collection efforts upon satisfaction of certain conditions, and have 
the right to vote on any Chapter 11 plan that alters their interests in any way.  To that 
end, although bankruptcy preempts traditional litigant discretion and control, it does 
so in a way that respects and strengthens creditor voice rather than stifles it. 
Specifically, under section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, the U.S. Trustee is 
charged with appointing one or more official creditors’ committees “as soon as 
practicable” after the commencement of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.  This 
typically involves sending solicitation letters and questionnaires to the unsecured 
creditors identified by the debtor in its Chapter 11 petition.198  The U.S. Trustee 
subsequently reviews completed questionnaires and selects committee members that 
best reflect the creditor body, both in terms of type and amount of claims held. 
Once formed, the committee has the power to retain counsel and other necessary 
professionals of the committee’s choice, which will be approved by the court barring 
                                                 
 198 For a more detailed account of this process, see Greg M. Zipes & Lisa L. Lambert, 
Creditors' Committee Formation Dynamics: Issues in the Real World, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
229 (2003). 
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any disqualifying conflicts of interest.  This selection process—the so-called “beauty 
contest”—typically involves the committee hearing brief presentations from 
potential representatives, which tend to emphasize the lawyer’s qualifications and 
strategies for protecting creditor interests.  Once selected, the lawyer owes fiduciary 
duties to the committee rather than any individual creditor or committee member. 
The bankruptcy estate pays the reasonable fees and expenses of professionals 
selected to represent the committee, as well as the reasonable expenses incurred by 
committee members in connection with their service on the committee.  By contrast, 
any fees or expenses associated with any committee member’s efforts to collect on 
its claims or litigate other matters in its individual capacity are the responsibility of 
the committee member alone.  Thus, committee members do not pay any of the costs 
incurred in connection with the committee’s performance of its duties, but they 
remain responsible for the costs of advancing their individual interests in the case.  
To that end, committee members typically hire their own separate counsel to 
advance their own interests in the case and maintain separation between their work 
as a member of the committee and these individual interests. 
Creditors’ committees can play a critical role in the cases in which they are 
appointed.  They serve as a “statutory watchdog,”199 charged with investigating and 
monitoring the debtor in possession’s conduct.200  Bankruptcy judges tend to place 
tremendous weight on the committees’ opinions concerning significant proposals 
and contested matters; so much so that sensible debtor’s counsel will at least try to 
resolve any conflicts with the committees before seeking court approval.  Ideally, the 
debtor and the committee will work closely throughout the case to frame any 
ultimate plan of reorganization and, in some cases, may be able to resolve issues to 
the point that they propose a joint plan for court approval. 
Notwithstanding its potential, the available data concerning the degree to which 
the bankruptcy committee structure helps to improve outcomes in Chapter 11 cases 
is mixed.  In one study, Stephen Lubben suggests that the appointment of a creditor’s 
committee tends to suggest strong creditor interest and, accordingly, a lower 
probability of failure.201  In another study, Michelle Harner and Jamie Marincic 
analyzed 296 Chapter 11 cases across six jurisdictions and supplemental survey data 
from committee members and professionals.202  The authors found that cases with 
only one official committee fared worse in terms of restructuring success and 
distribution to creditors than cases with no committees and cases with multiple 
committees.203  Accordingly, their proposals included greater use of “multiple 
                                                 
 199 See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Role of Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganization, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
749, n.68 (2011) (noting the common reference to official committees as “statutory 
watchdogs”). 
 200 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006) (setting forth powers of committee, including the ability to 
“investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor”; 
“participate in the formulation of a plan”; and “request the appointment of a trustee or 
examiner”). 
 201 Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter 11 “Failure” (2009) (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper 
No. 1375163), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1375163. 
 202 Harner & Marincic, supra note 199. 
 203 Id. at 794-95. 
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committees, categorical single committees and more robust disclosures that target 
that goal.”204  The authors concluded, “By striving to give more creditors a stronger, 
more informed voice on committees, the committee structure could help protect the 
process from the often subtle and questionable influence of just a few.”205   
The beauty of the bankruptcy committee structure is its potential as a framework 
for empowering those who have strong incentives to monitor, spreading the costs of 
monitoring across the claim pool, and providing clear parameters for designated 
peers to speak for the group.  Individual claimants may still monitor and participate 
in the case on their own, but they may also choose to rely upon the committee to 
protect their interests with respect to the big picture matters that tend to dominate 
these cases.  At the same time, the committee, as the collective voice of the claim 
pool, should enjoy far more influence in critical negotiations and contested matters 
than any individual creditor.   
2.  Constitution and Functions of Plaintiffs’ Oversight Committees 
Conceptually, a formal plaintiffs’ oversight committee (POC) can serve a 
similarly valuable role in quasi-class action, though, as demonstrated in bankruptcy, 
demands careful attention to several key questions.  First, it is necessary to clearly 
define the POC’s purpose.  In bankruptcy, official committees are charged with 
representing the collective interests of their constituencies by challenging actions 
that might dissipate the estate’s assets or unduly elevate some creditors above others.  
In the quasi-class action context, the POC should serve a similarly broad purpose—
advancing the shared interests of the claim pool, challenging decisions and 
settlement terms that unduly elevate or undermine the interests of sub-groups, taking 
steps to improve cohesion within the pool where possible, and improving plaintiffs’ 
access to the information necessary to allow them to make informed decisions about 
their respective claims.  In contrast to the nominal representative plaintiff in class 
action litigation, however, this role is focused on improving collective voice and 
facilitating access to information that will promote informed individual decisions 
rather than identifying a figurehead206 whose presence may be used to rationalize 
coercion. 
This conception of what the POC’s objectives will be should provide some 
guidance with respect to the next question: Who will make up the POC?  As the 
Harner and Marincic study suggests, any proposal must pay close attention to the 
need to improve voice across the diverse claim pool and limit potential capture by 
those seeking to manipulate the committee process to advance their individual or 
sub-group interests at the expense of the group.  This need to incorporate the views 
of a potentially diverse group of plaintiffs, however, must be balanced against the 
                                                 
 204 Id. at 803. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform is Not Enough: Assuring More than Merely 
"Adequate" Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 951 (2004) (“[B]oth courts 
and commentators have observed that in practice, class representatives often serve as little 
more than mere figureheads.”); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New 
Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 27-28 (2002) ("Named 
representative plaintiffs have proven to be merely figureheads: ineffective, passive, 
unsophisticated, and completely disregarded by both courts and class attorneys."). 
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need to keep the size of the committee manageable.  In short, a committee that is too 
small may not be representative of the claim pool at large, but a committee with too 
many members may find it difficult to hold regular conferences and have the 
discussions necessary to shape and advance its objectives. 
Moreover, committee turnover is always a possibility in any aggregate 
proceeding.  Given the potential that some POC members may settle their claims 
during the course of the MDL, the framework must account for replacing committee 
members who no longer have an interest in the case.  This potential to settle with 
individual plaintiffs as the case advances also raises the specter of POC members (or 
their counsel) using their appointments to obtain unduly favorable settlements of 
their own claims at the expense of the claim pool.  In sum, the POC must be 
structured carefully to avoid capture, depletion of critical voices within the 
committee, and disloyalty by one or more members. 
Perhaps the most complex question is how this framework can be structured to 
empower the POC to fulfill its objectives.  Mass tort litigation is in many ways more 
complex and uncertain than corporate bankruptcy and involves creditors who tend to 
be less sophisticated in legal matters than the typical unsecured business creditor.  
This suggests that the POC will require, at a minimum, representation or other 
guidance by experienced, independent counsel or a “special officer”207 in the course 
of its work.  To effectively fulfill its obligations and reach its potential, the 
framework must also be designed to provide the POC with timely access to 
information concerning the progress of the case, including any settlement 
negotiations, and a forum for communicating its views with – and obtaining input 
from – other plaintiffs. 
Although conceptually promising, the preceding discussion demonstrates 
significant obstacles to applying a plaintiff-centered governance model to mass tort 
aggregation.   
3.  Selection of Committee Representatives 
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty in such a proposal is identifying and 
appointing potential committee members in a manner that adds value without 
introducing new avenues for abuse.  Those with potential claims can be identified 
and solicited for committee membership early in virtually any aggregative 
proceeding.  Nonetheless, the U.S. Trustee controls this decision in bankruptcy, and 
there is no comparable organization in other forms of aggregation.  This task must 
thus fall to courts, the lawyers the courts will oversee, or the decision of the claim 
pool.  At this stage, counsel have a strong interest in selecting passive plaintiffs for 
committee appointments and, given their capacity to flood the pool,208 may also be in 
position to manipulate any vote.  To that end, notwithstanding the potential conflict 
with democratic principles, it may be necessary at this point to place this 
responsibility in either the supervising court or some other judicial body. 
A committee is, of course, only as representative and independent as its 
members, so the criteria for selection of committee members must be framed 
carefully.  In this respect, judges should attempt to identify willing plaintiffs who 
have demonstrated both a commitment to active involvement in the case and ensure 
                                                 
 207 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (2009).  
 208 See supra Part III.C.3. 
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that the plaintiffs selected provide a fair representation of the diverse interests 
present in the case.  To control for the potential for capture, courts should limit the 
number of plaintiffs with direct or indirect relationships with lead counsel or other 
parties in the case or on the committee.  Likewise, to avoid the infusion of claimants 
who are interested more in any fee they can obtain from serving in this capacity, 
committee member compensation, if any, should be tied to work actually performed 
in connection with the case. 
4.  Responsibilities 
The primary function of committee members would be to direct and oversee the 
work of hired professionals, provide a forum for committed plaintiffs to voice their 
concerns, and generate truly plaintiff-centered assessments of common benefit fund 
assessments and allocation and other key developments in the case.  They would 
have access to all discovery and receive periodic reports from lead and committee 
counsel concerning the progress of the case.  Lead counsel would be required to 
submit any proposed settlement to the committee prior to submission to the claim 
pool.  After a global settlement is reached, the plaintiffs’ oversight committee would 
be asked to analyze and produce a report to plaintiffs concerning their individual and 
collective views of the risks and benefits of litigation and settlement.   
Another function of the plaintiffs’ oversight committee would be to actively 
encourage ongoing communication and cooperation within the claim pool.  As 
Elizabeth Burch recently observed, this coming together at an early stage where their 
respective objectives in the litigation can be focused on shared goals “can strengthen 
group cohesion” and, ultimately, may improve their willingness to come together on 
other matters.209  And, as discussed below, building this community cohesion at this 
early stage may not only improve collective oversight of the process but also 
encourage greater participation in and satisfaction with global settlement.   
5.  Committee Counsel 
Given the scientific, procedural and legal complexities associated with these 
cases, counsel will often be necessary to assist the committee in monitoring, framing 
its objections, and communicating its views with the court and the claim pool.  As 
with retained counsel in bankruptcy cases, committee counsel in this context may 
enjoy considerable influence and, accordingly, should not have or represent any 
party that has an interest in the case.  Although this condition might unduly limit the 
pool of viable counsel in cases that have evolved and matured over an extended 
period of time, in which case experience in the field may be both necessary and 
disqualifying, this should not be a concern in the vast majority of mass tort cases that 
are consolidated shortly after a triggering event today. 
Ideally, committee counsel’s compensation should not be tied to any settlement 
due to the risk that any advice may be tainted by the lawyer’s interest in being paid.  
Such a conflict is unlikely in bankruptcy because the Code expressly provides for 
compensation of professionals on an interim basis during the course of the case.210  
As noted previously, compensation in other forms of non-class aggregation tends to 
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 210 See 11 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). 
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be decided by the judge only after settlement,211 and the legal basis for compensating 
counsel in multidistrict litigation is far from certain. Notwithstanding this 
uncertainty, the current trend toward recognizing the propriety of common benefit 
funds even outside the class action context and the extraordinary competition for 
these roles suggests that the risk of nonpayment should not be a significant barrier to 
obtaining qualified counsel for committee counsel and other professionals. 
B.  Advantages in Litigation and Settlement 
1.  Plaintiff Monitoring and Conflicts of Interest 
As noted previously, the multiple layers of lawyers between many plaintiffs and 
lead counsel in multidistrict mass tort litigation and the range of conflicts of interest 
at each level limits individual plaintiffs’ options for monitoring and having their 
voice heard in the proceedings.  It is well settled that individual plaintiffs lack 
sufficient power and resources to challenge large corporate wrongdoers effectively 
in civil litigation, yet we tend to rely on ethical regimes and the virtually non-
existent threat of ethical enforcement or malpractice litigation to somehow protect 
plaintiffs from similarly powerful and well-funded entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.  Although modern aggregation has given rise to a plaintiffs’ bar that can 
match the most powerful defendants in terms of resources and expertise, it has not, 
to date, provided plaintiffs with a sufficient mechanism for protecting their own 
interests when they conflict with the bar. 
The oversight committee approach fills this void by empowering plaintiffs to 
have voice as a group, both within the proceedings and as a matter of coordinating 
and reconciling their conflicting perspectives.  Instead of the scattering of random 
voices expressed through diverse avenues that may never reach decision makers 
today, such a unified framework for plaintiffs to come together and affirm or reject 
decisions that directly influence their interests.  In so doing, it matches the same 
basic design of civil litigation generally—collective oversight for litigation of their 
collective interests instead of individual oversight of an individual case—and 
provides the assistance necessary to make this collective oversight viable. 
2.  Improved Decision Making in Settlement 
As noted previously, the practical limits on direct plaintiff education concerning 
their prospective recoveries under a global settlement and risks at trial reduce the 
prospects that individual plaintiffs will make informed settlement or opt out 
decisions.  Although steering committee and individual counsel employ town hall 
sessions and similar efforts to advance their visions of the case collectively, these 
sessions are frequently one-sided affairs that either praise or vilify the settlement 
according to the preferences of counsel.   
In fostering group cohesion and direct dialogue amongst victims, the committee 
proposal addresses these shortcomings.  By virtue of their shared status as victims, 
plaintiffs may enjoy a level of credibility and potential for group cohesion that 
outsiders—including their own counsel—do not.212  They can speak to their concerns 
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at a level of understanding that even experienced counsel fail to appreciate.213  The 
proposed framework promotes and provides a clear forum for group deliberation, 
which can improve their willingness and ability to cooperate.214  Rather than relying 
upon the potential for informal groups to form, develop an action plan, and advance 
the group’s interests on an ad hoc basis,215 the committee structure provides a clear 
framework for the group to develop information, share it with the claim pool, and 
ensure that any global settlement truly reflects their interests.  And in supporting this 
group with independent counsel who effectively fills the role of “special officer,” 
this structure can better ensure that the group evolves in a manner focused on 
advancing plaintiffs’ interests and avoids capture by individual parties or repeat 
players.216 
Individual plaintiffs remain free to accept or reject the oversight committee’s 
opinions under this proposal, but even those who reject the committee’s views stand 
to benefit from the additional information and input.  These insights, tailored toward 
emphasizing matters critical to similarly situated and dissimilar plaintiffs alike, can 
encourage plaintiffs to internalize critical aspects of their claims—to see them as 
more than a mere ticket to recovery but as a means of vindicating their rights—and 
suggest, overtly or otherwise, questions they should ask of themselves and their 
counsel before committing to a course of action.  At the same time, it allows 
plaintiffs to tell their own stories in a forum that will, by its nature, be widely 
distributed and publicized; which can serve to improve a plaintiff’s understanding of 
her own claims as well as the claims of others within the group. 
C.  Potential Objections and Limitations 
Any framework that fundamentally alters existing practices necessarily involves 
integration issues that must be addressed before implementation.  In bankruptcy, for 
example, the precise design of the modern committee structure was premised upon 
creditor oversight provisions that existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898217 and 
was refined to account for decades of experience and several detailed inquiries into 
the shortcomings of those provisions.218 Multidistrict litigation, however, has no 
comparable plaintiff oversight mechanism and involves administrative issues that 
                                                 
 213 See generally Taft, supra note 176 (discussing disconnect between attorneys and 
clients); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105 (2010) (outlining 
how plaintiffs in global settlements may play on cognitive biases to produce settlements that 
disadvantage plaintiffs). 
 214 Burch, supra note 207, at 48. 
 215 Id. at 22. 
 216 Id. at 52-53 (outlining potential use of a “special officer” to encourage group formation 
and focus on issues that improve cohesion and avoid capture). 
 217 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 541 Stat. 544, 544-66, repealed by An Act to 
Establish a Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 
(1970). 
 218 See Furthering Asbestos Claims Transparency Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 4369 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial, and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2-3 (2012) (written statement of Professor S. Todd Brown) (discussing 
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player fraud and abuse under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). 
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may be more complex.  Given the focus of this proposal as a first-stage proof of 
concept, however, this section focuses less on objections to specific aspects of the 
proposal than on conceptual objections.   
1. Plaintiff Sophistication and Participation 
One fear is that mass tort plaintiffs may lack sufficient sophistication to oversee 
the process effectively, though this fear may say more about those who express it 
than the shortcomings of the victims themselves.  Few issues in even the most 
complex litigation, however, are beyond the comprehension of most men and 
women, assuming, of course, that their counselors provide competent guidance and 
counsel. Our civil litigation system, of course, relies upon lay juries to decide 
similarly complex cases, and the professional’s job in advising clients is arguably far 
less complex and provides greater flexibility in clarifying any ambiguities and 
confusion.   
The systemic and pervasive skepticism of plaintiffs’ capacity to make decisions 
concerning matters that may have profound and lasting effects on their daily lives 
says more about the elite-centered culture of litigation and academia than it does 
about the plaintiffs themselves.  In the Deepwater Horizon case, for example, we 
should expect that at least some of the affected plaintiffs have an extensive 
understanding of oil drilling, environmental science, and other technical issues that 
likely far exceed that of the lawyers controlling the case.  Similarly, given the reach 
of the Toyota Sudden Acceleration MDL, at least some of the affected plaintiffs are 
likely to have far superior expertise in the relevant engineering, economics and other 
disciplines than the lawyers advancing their interests. 
This skepticism reflects less a fear that plaintiffs will make decisions that run 
contrary to their own objectives than the prospect that they will have perspectives 
that differ from lead counsel and transferee courts.  Improving access to information 
strips away some of the lawyer’s information advantage in the relationship, but it 
does not do so in a way that undermines the ostensible role of lawyer as agent.  To 
that end, empowering plaintiffs through improving access to information is 
consistent with substantive law.  In sum, the objection here is less one with its 
consistency with applicable law than it is with the manner in which that law places 
control in the hands of those who are harmed. 
Another difficulty with this proposal is that it depends upon the presence of 
plaintiffs who are not only committed to advancing the litigation but also stepping 
forward as independent representatives of the community of plaintiffs.  This 
framework will presumably be limited where few, if any, plaintiffs would name and 
blame and thus never claim in the absence of aggregation.  Just as there is no one-
size-fits-all mass tort case, the approach to governance in mass tort litigation must 
conform to the needs and preferences of the plaintiffs.  Indeed, official committees 
are not appointed in many small Chapter 11 cases because creditors simply do not 
have sufficient stakes to justify participation.  And if no plaintiffs can be bothered to 
oversee a case, this fact alone has value in telling us about the claiming commitment 
of the claim pool and may support an approach that looks far more like modern 
governance by counsel than this proposal.   
Even in cases where plaintiffs are unable or unwilling to take a direct role, their 
absence may be offset to a degree by reserving most or all steering committee and 
other leadership roles for those attorneys who represent distinct plaintiff subgroups 
exclusively and preferring traditional plaintiffs’ lawyers over mass tort repeat 
players.  Although a lawyer’s clients may consent to representation by counsel who 
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represent others with conflicting interests, this consent is not always readily apparent 
and, in any case, cannot be assumed beyond the lawyer’s own clients.  In shaping 
leadership committees to reflect these distinct interests and reducing the prospects of 
control by repeat players, the leadership should not only advance their shared 
interests but also promote arms-length balancing of their antagonistic interests in any 
settlement. 
2.  Committee Counsel Domination 
Given the relative complexity of mass tort litigation, and the need for competent 
counsel to guide the committee, the risk that repeat player committee counsel will 
come to dominate the proceedings to their own benefit cannot be overlooked.  This 
risk, however, is tempered by the fact that committee counsel will be appointed by 
and subject to the direct control of committee members who are not, of course, 
repeat players.  As in bankruptcy, this risk can be further limited by excluding 
lawyers who represent individual plaintiffs in the matter or have extensive 
overlapping interests with other repeat players involved in the case. 
3. Waste and Delay 
The use of formal committees is not, of course, without cost.  Bankruptcy 
committee professional fees frequently run into the millions in the largest cases, and 
their work appears, at times, to be duplicative of debtors’ counsel.219  The need for 
independent counsel necessarily involves costs.  Likewise, regular report 
preparation, information sharing, development of communication strategies across 
the claim pool, preparation of the POC’s assessment of any proposed settlement, and 
other functions will entail costs and, at times, may draw lead counsel’s attention 
away from the important work of investigating and litigating the case.  And adding 
another layer of bureaucracy into aggregate governance may introduce a variety of 
other costs and delays that are difficult to predict at the outset. 
For some, these risks alone are sufficient to reject any sort of plaintiff-centered 
governance proposal.  Indeed, instead of addressing the power disparity between 
plaintiffs and the lawyers who dominate aggregate litigation, recent proposals 
attempt to expand it by eradicating the last remaining vestige of plaintiff autonomy 
by placing the final settlement decision in the hands of counsel.  The American Law 
Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Aggregate Litigation, for example, seeks to bind 
plaintiffs to the collective decision of the claim pool through advance consent.220 As 
demonstrated, the raw majority vote proposal is so readily manipulated by 
accelerated recruiting practices as to effectively provide lead counsel unfettered 
control under the modern framework.  Combined with the ex ante consent provision, 
this approach would render the effort to strip plaintiffs’ power over the decisions that 
will forever alter their rights complete. 
                                                 
 219 Much of this duplication, however, stems from the fact that creditors’ committees are 
often adverse to the debtor in possession.  Where matters are contested, for example, they will 
hire competing experts to evaluate critical questions.  The POC model, on the other hand, does 
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directly involve protecting the claim pool’s interests. 
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Rather than continue the “ongoing search for novel ways to bind individual mass 
tort plaintiffs to outcomes by which they do not affirmatively agree to be bound . . . 
or do not affirmatively support,”221 the collective objectives of substantive tort law 
are better served by expanding plaintiff monitoring, group building, and providing 
victims with an additional forum for obtaining the information they need to make 
informed decisions.  Indeed, many of the problems that have been identified in mass 
tort litigation have their origins in the historical emphasis on efficiency without 
adequate attention to the other objectives of substantive and procedural law.  The 
claim manufacturing practices that ultimately defined the silica mass tort and fueled 
asbestos litigation for more than a decade were, in most respects, a model of 
efficiency even as they reinforced the worst public perceptions of mass tort practice 
and lawyers. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Quasi-class aggregation yields complex and interrelated concerns.  It generates 
several layers of conflicts of interest and may accelerate recruiting practices that 
introduce dubious and passive claims.  Moreover, in delaying plaintiffs’ practical 
opportunities for voice and exit until after a global settlement is reached, long-term 
multidistrict consolidations may coerce acceptance of unfavorable settlement terms 
at the expense of individual plaintiffs’ legitimate private interests.  Even if we accept 
that quasi-class aggregation is necessary, overseen by men and women of high 
personal integrity and capable of superior economic recoveries to other forms of 
aggregation, these costs are too often ignored.  Theories of legal practice tend to 
collapse under the day-to-day realities and demands of the moment; even those who 
have strong personal and professional ethics are susceptible to ethical blind spots and 
rationalizations.  And the mere preference of the majority may be of little comfort to 
plaintiffs who find their cases delayed, rights altered, and voices muted in the 
inexorable march toward settlement. 
It is easy to characterize a plaintiff-centered approach as placing too much faith 
in the capacity of ordinary citizens to carry the weight necessary to realize its full 
potential.  The same could be said of civil litigation generally or, given the collective 
barriers to exit and voice, even the marginal opportunities for meaningful 
involvement in the current quasi-class action model.  But where vindication of their 
injuries matters most to plaintiffs, either as a matter of individual right or community 
responsibility, procedural empowerment reinforces rather than rejects or dampens 
the expectation and promise of civil litigation and restores the victims’ place within 
it.  It transforms the dynamics of the choice to oversee the litigation, regardless of 
what that choice may be for any given plaintiff.  And if that choice is to simply 
forego the option of speaking with a collective voice, it is surely more voluntary and 
consistent with the principles of democratic governance than a model premised upon 
paternalism, usurpation of control and systemic distrust of victims. 
Moreover, even if these concerns ultimately foreclose the use of plaintiff 
committees in all but a few cases, the foregoing suggests a need for greater 
recognition of the potential intra and inter-case conflicts of interest that inhere in 
multidistrict consolidation when shaping the steering committees and other 
leadership roles within these cases.  Each plaintiff is entitled to voice in the 
proceeding, if not directly then by counsel who has both the power to advance the 
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plaintiff’s antagonistic interests and the incentive to do so zealously.  This is true 
even if doing so may complicate global settlement negotiations or requires 
disaggregation of some portion of the claim pool early in the process or in a manner 
that reduces the aggregate settlement premium. 
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